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The incidence of violence in Honduras currently is the highest in Honduran history. In 
2014, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported the Honduras homicide 
rate, at 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, as the highest in the world for nations outside of 
war. It is the foundation of this thesis that the Honduran security collapse is due to 
unresolved internal factors—political, economic, and societal—as well as the influence of 
foreign factors and actors—the evolution of the global illicit trade. Two of the most 
important areas affecting public security in Honduras are the challenges posed by 
transnational organized crime and the relative weakness and fragility of the Honduran 
state to provide basic needs and security to the population. The emergence of criminal 
gangs and drug traffickers, and the government’s security policies, are all factors that 
have worsened public security. The crime environment has overwhelmed the police, 
military, judicial system and overcrowded the prison system with mostly juvenile petty 
delinquents. Moreover, with a high impunity rate of nearly 95 percent for homicides, 
killing in Honduras has become an activity without consequences. The latest state’s 
response is with re-militarization of security, highlighting the dilemma of the challenges 
of combatting internal violence and transnational organized crime in a weak state. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2014 Global Study on 
Homicides cited the Honduras homicide rate as the highest in the world. After a 
significant decline in homicides from 56 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002 to 33.6 in 2003, 
the rate nearly double by 2008, and in 2012 increased to 90.4 per 100,000 (see Table 1).1 
In the last two decades, street gangs have emerged as leading criminal actors responsible 
for the increase in crime, and in the last decade drug traffickers have increased the use of 
Honduran ports, airstrips, and roads to transport cocaine.  
 
 
Table 1.   Honduras Homicide Rates 1999–2012  
(from UNODC, 2014)2 
The majority of homicides in Honduras are concentrated in urban areas, especially 
San Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa, and La Ceiba. But crime affects the entire country—in 
2012, all eighteen departments had higher rates than the global, and the Americas average 
                                                 
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013 Global Study on Homicide Trends, Context, Data    
(New York, NY United Nations Publications, March 2014), 107.            
2 UNODC, 2013 Global Study on Homicide, 126. 
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(6.9 and 16 per 100,000, respectively).3 The state of Gracias A Dios was the only  
state to record a homicide rate of less than 23 per 100,000 (see Figure 1).4  
In addition to the homicide rates, Honduras has some of the highest negative indicators of 
citizen security and development in Latin America these include the poverty rate, number 
of gangs, and gang members.5 
 
Figure 1.  Honduras: Homicides by Department in 2012 (from Universidad 
Autónoma de Honduras Observatorio de la Violencia, 2012) 6 
Honduras and El Salvador have recorded the highest homicide rates in Latin 
America yearly since 1995.7 Only El Salvador’s 1995–1998 rates exceeded Honduras’s 
91.4 in 2011.8 Overall, the security situation for Central America is worrisome, with 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 107. 
4 Universidad Autónoma de Honduras, Cifras del Observatorio de Violencia, accessed July 03, 2013, 
https//www.unah.edu.hn/uploaded/content/category/926831121.pdf; departments in Honduras is the same 
as states in the U.S.–their use is interchangeable in this thesis.  
5 Lirio Gutierrez Rivera, Territories of Violence State, Marginal Youth, and Insecurity in Honduras 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
6 Dirección de Estadística Policía Nacional/ Universidad Autónoma de Honduras Observatorio de la 
Violencia, accessed July 3, 2013, https//www.unah.edu.hn/?art=1152.  
7 Mark Ungar, Policing Democracy Overcoming Obstacles of Citizen Security in Latin America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 112. 
8 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011 Global Study On Homicide Trends, Context, Data, 
(New York, NY: United Nations Publications, 2012), 115. 
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death rates at or above the rates recorded during the wars in the 1980s. For instance, the 
intentional homicide rate in El Salvador during the 1990s was over 40 percent higher than 
the average deaths due to the war in the 1980s.9  
In response to the breakdown in public security, the Honduran government 
instituted zero tolerance policies, adapting the New York City’s crime-fighting strategy 
that reduced crime levels significantly in the mid-1990s. Under zero tolerance, the most 
mundane of infractions are considered important, and leaving infractions unaddressed is 
believed to lead to further deterioration and delinquency. 
However, the Honduran outcome has not been positive. As a result, Honduran 
citizens are victimized by gangs, drug traffickers, state armed actors, and freelance 
criminals. These actors have taken control of territories and through the use of violence, 
have permanently altered Honduran activities and social behavior. Moreover, the 
government institutions entrusted to uphold law and order—the police and military—
have been corrupted and infiltrated by the criminal gangs and narcotic traffickers. In 
other words, in Honduras, gangs, organized crime, and state policing institutions all use 
violence to gain control of territory and, hence the population.10 This study will seek to 
explain the exponential rise in violence in Honduras. Additionally, it will chronicle the 
latest responses to the increased in criminality.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
While violent crime generally includes murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and 
rape,11 the research in Honduras are most accurate for murder and probably robbery. 
Since the late 1990s, Hondurans have been killing each other at the highest per capita rate 
in the world, and the country regularly holds a spot among the worst in Latin America in 
                                                 
9 Dennis Rodgers, “Living in the Shadow of Death Gangs, Violence and Social Order in Urban 
Nicaragua, 1996–2002,” Journal of Latin American Studies 38, no. 2 (May 2006): 268. 
10 Julie Marie Bunck and Michael Ross Fowler, Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation Drug Trafficking 
and the Law in Central America (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), 258. 
11 Gary LaFree, “Declining Violent Crime Rates in the 1990s Predicting Crime Booms and Busts,” 
Annual Review of Sociology 25, no. 1 (1999): 146. 
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this dubious category.12 Why this is so offers both a confirmation and contradictions to 
causal explanations of criminality and delinquency. The demographics of crime in 
Honduras are consistent with findings for other nations as to age, sex, economic status, 
family dynamics, and settings. Crime is highest among male juveniles—in their 
developmental years to early adulthood—declining as they age (see Figure 2).13 These 
young males most often come from fragmented or single-parent homes in mostly poor 
urban environments.14 But while background may provide a necessary explanation for 
criminal behavior, it is insufficient in that the majority of the population with the same 
background does not turn to criminal behavior. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Global homicide rate, by sex and age group, 2012 or latest year 
(from UNODC Homicide Statistics, 2014) 
The study of crime in Honduras is further complicated by its depictions by the 
media, popular opinion, and political discourse that have successfully set a misleading 
narrative. For instance, gangs are often portrayed as the biggest threat to the security in 
the nation, despite evidence to the contrary.15 While gangs pose a definite menace to 
community security, their loose organization and fluid structure means that they do not 
                                                 
12 UNODC, 2011 Global Study on Crime, 102–125. 
13 UNODC, 2013 Global Study on Homicide, 30. 
14 Michael R. Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime (Redwood City, CA 
Stanford University Press, 1990), 178. 
15 Ungar, Policing Democracy, 112. 
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pose a structural challenge. On the other hand, Honduran authorities argue that drug 
traffickers and organized crime are primarily responsible for turning the country into 
what is widely understood to be a “criminal’s paradise.” Nevertheless, there is a nexus 
between gangs and drugs. Explaining the rise in violence is important, because it will 
validate, or provide alternatives, to the hypothesis that gangs, drugs, state institutions, 
government policies, and structural combine in various ways to account for insecurity. 
An accurate understanding of the problem can potentially lead to a revision of policies 
toward violence in both Honduras and the Northern isthmus of Central America.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis begins with the following set of problems: the violence in Honduras 
today is greater than at any point in its history. What explains it? The study of violence 
has focused on structural factors, state institutions, and the emergence of gangs, 
organized crime, and drugs trafficking. However, the study in these areas is limited.  
The economy is a major structural factor affecting the development and limiting 
the resources of the state to address insecurity. Nearly twenty-five years ago, Honduras 
ranked at the bottom among Central American nations in terms of per capita income, 
employment, literacy, health care, life expectancy, and nutrition. That has not changed—
on the contrary the GDP per capita in 2006 was the same as in 1980.16 The contrast with 
Nicaragua may be instructive. Although Honduras and Nicaragua share similar poverty 
levels and size, and yet despite the fact that Nicaragua had a long history of long internal 
conflicts, Nicaragua has the second lowest homicide rates in the region. Why this is so 
cannot be explained by the economy or in the failure of consolidation of democracy.17  
A second focus is the role that institutions play in the increase in crime. Honduran 
institutions—military, police, courts, political parties—ranked among the lowest in terms 
of citizen’s trust. Corruption is widespread throughout most institutions, making it 
difficult to conduct the most basic of transactions. State institutions are rife with greed 
                                                 
16 Alison Acker, Honduras The Making of a Banana Republic (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 11. 
17 Dennis Rodgers, “Joining the Gang and Becoming a Broder The Violence of Ethnography,” 
Bulletin of Latin American Research 26, no. 4 (2007) 444–465. 
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and incompetence. According to scholar John Booth, “the inability of the Honduran 
government to effectively combat crime led to the increasing public insecurity and the 
decline of public life.”18  
The armed forces have occupied a position of great influence, often operating 
without constraints. For a long period, the armed forces operated as a mediator between 
the Partido Nacional (PN) and Partido Liberal (PL), earning the label as Honduras’s third 
party. Additionally, the influence extended over the police and security forces at the ports 
and borders, where a great deal of illicit activity takes place.  
A third aspect of the problem are the two new groups that have emerged to 
challenge the state monopoly of violence and become major actors—the maras (mara and 
pandilla are Spanish terms used interchangeably, in Honduras, for gang) and drug 
trafficking organizations. Recently, maras have taken a backseat as attention has shifted 
to organized crime and the corruption it funds. Although maras take part in the drug 
trade, it is not clear how significant their involvement is. Unlike the maras, drug 
traffickers are well organized and appear untouchable in Honduras. This dynamic of 
maras, organized crime and a malfunctioning state combines to create the current security 
environment.  
Because of the multiple factors offered to explain crime in Central America in 
general, and in Honduras in particular, a holistic approach to understand the problem is 
required. On the one hand, structural factors such as poverty, social exclusion, and the 
breakdown of the family dynamic play a significant role in the rise of violence. On the 
other hand, institutions such as the police, the military, and the political elites have 
deliberately manipulated the system to their private benefit, thereby undermining public 
security. This study argues that a combination of the rise of transnational organized 
crime—changes in the global illicit trade, mainly cocaine trafficking from the Caribbean 
to Central America and decline of the major Colombian TCOs and the rise of Mexican 
TCOs, and the weak internal government security apparatus, all contribute to making 
Honduras one of the world’s most dangerous places outside of actual war zones.  
                                                 
18 John A Booth, Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America Global 
Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 5th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), 175. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on Honduras is not extensive. Scholars such as Julie Marie Bunck, 
Michael Ross Fowler, and Lirio Gutierrez Rivera argue that after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the region was forgotten. Overall, most of the literature on criminality in Central 
America has focused on the social, political, and economic processes of development, in 
particular, neoliberalism and globalization.19 Recent literature analyzed the emergence of 
gangs, drug trafficking, and the policing policies the Honduran state enacted in an effort 
to reduce crime and gain the monopoly of violence. The least studied areas are gangs, 
drug trafficking, and the role that prisons have played in the increased violence and 
delinquency.20 This thesis will contribute to the limited literature addressing the rise of 
violence in Honduras.  
Gutierrez Rivera offers one of the most complete assessments of the Honduran 
violence, by examining the link between security, violence, and territory. He argues that 
“the failed security policies—as well as the persistence of social violence, crime, and 
delinquency—are linked to the Honduran state’s difficulty with ordering national 
territory.”21 That inability to control national territory disenfranchises the population and 
explains the landscape of violence. 
Most studies about Honduran criminal actors begin with maras. The two major 
gangs in Honduras, the Mara Salvatrucha (commonly known as the MS-13), and the 18th 
Street gang (Calle Dieciocho or Barrio 18), trace their origins to Los Angeles.22 Some 
scholars argue that gangs are taking over, and that unless authorities take corrective 
action, the mara problem will worsen.23 According to Ana Arana’s alarming article, 
“How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” gangs have become a major actor in 
                                                 
19 Rodgers, “Joining the Gang and Becoming a Broder,” 444–465. 
20 Lirio Gutierrez Rivera, Territories of Violence State, Marginal Youth, and Insecurity in Honduras 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
21 Ibid., 10. 
22 Thomas C. Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner, Maras Gang Violence and Security in 
Central America (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011), 1. 
23 Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 3 (May–June 
2005) 98–110; Max G. Manwaring, “Street Gangs The New Urban Insurgency” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005).   
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Central America with potential security implications for the region and even the United 
States. 
While the literature on gangs in Central America describes them as a growing 
problem, it also emphasizes that their importance in overall crime in the region is unclear. 
Authorities have a difficult time assessing the number of gangs and gang members and 
their participation in crimes. According to Joanna Mateo, although the gangs in 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador share names and origins, they are localized and 
take on a specific country dynamic. Each of these countries has its own unique gang 
story.24  
Gangs are a complex phenomenon to which there are no easy explanations or 
solutions. Gang members are both the perpetrators and the victims of the violence. With 
crime and delinquency among the major concerns for the populace, a preference for 
tougher penalties has been a common trend. Studies of gangs focus on the effects of 
structural problems—the relationship of economic factors, social classes and the political 
environment.25 Likewise, migration, family disintegration and the culture of resolving 
differences through violence are part of the explanations offered.26  
Jose Miguel Cruz presents a cross-country comparative study to explain the 
divergent outcomes in criminal violence in Central America.27 His particular focus is to 
explain why Nicaragua has less violent crimes than does its neighbors Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador. According to Cruz, several factors are at play, the high 
homicide rates in the northern isthmus can be traced in great part to the state. The state 
institutions have played a major role in the reproduction of criminal violence and the 
                                                 
24 Joanna Mateo, “Street Gangs of Honduras.” In Maras Gang Violence and Security in Central 
America, edited by Bruneau, Thomas, Lucia Dammert and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin: University of Texas 
Press Austin, 2011), 87. 
25 Maria L. Santacruz Giralt, and José Miguel Cruz Alas, “Las Maras en El Salvador Maras y 
pandillas en Centroamérica Vol. I (2001) 24, Universidad de Centroamérica, accessed June 2013, 
http//www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/libros/libromarasypandillasencentroamericavol.I.pdf 
26 Jose Miguel Cruz, “Government Responses and the Dark Side of Gang Suppression in Central 
America,” in Maras Gang Violence and Security in Central America, edited by Bruneau, Thomas, Lucia 
Dammert and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin: University of Texas Press Austin, 2011), 137. 
27 Jose Miguel Cruz, “Government Responses,” 137. 
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development of groups responsible for it. The faulty security institutions are not only 
inefficient and indifferent to crime, but also participate in the reproduction of criminal 
violence.28 With Honduran levels of crime significantly higher today, and with Nicaragua 
similar poverty levels and relative low homicide rates, the comparison undermines the 
importance of the economy or in the failure of consolidation of democracy as 
explanations for the rise in homicides.29  
The surge in crime beginning at the turn of the twenty-first century had several 
causes (see Table 1). In 1998, Hurricane Mitch devastated and set back the Honduran 
economy, displacing thousands of people and causing approximately $3 billion in 
damage. According to emigration statistics, 61.4 percent of all Hondurans living outside 
the country in 2006 left the country between 1998 and 2005 to escape the physical and 
economic devastation.30 Hondurans continue to migrate to the United States; today the 
reasons have expanded beyond economic.  
The migration of Hondurans to the United States is in contrast to the patterns of 
migration from Nicaraguans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans. Overall, the immigration 
from these countries has increased since 1970. That year, fewer than 20,000 immigrants 
from each of these countries resided in the United States. In contrast, “in 2009, that 
number had grown to a quarter million Nicaraguans, half a million Hondurans, three-
quarters of a million Guatemalans and more than a million Salvadorans.”31 From 1990 to 
2009, Hondurans were the fastest growing population of Central Americans in the United 
States. “By 2009, there were 63 Hondurans immigrants living in the United States per 
1,000 people in Honduras,” surpassing Guatemala’s 57 per 1,000.32  
The Honduran migration being the most recent, in combination with the increased 
U.S. security on the borders and immigration enforcement, means Hondurans have been 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 24. 
29 Dennis Rodgers, “Joining the Gang and Becoming a Broder,” 444–465. 
30 Mateo, “Street Gangs of Honduras,” 93. 
31 Sarah Blanchard, Erin R. Hamilton, Nestor Rodriguez, and Hirotoshi Yoshioka, “Shifting Trends in 
Central American Migration A Demographic Examination of Increasing Honduran-U.S. Immigration and 
Deportation,” The Latin Americanist 55, no. 4 (2011) 65. 
32 Ibid. 
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deported in larger numbers (see Figure 3). The Hondurans’ shorter time span in the 
United States has made their assimilation more difficult, exposing them for deportations.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Number of Deportations and Deportation Ratios, 2000–2009, of 
Hondurans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans from the 
United States (from Blanchard, etc., Shifting Trends, 2011).33 
In fiscal year 2010, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained 
363,064 aliens and the average detention population was 30,085. Hondurans accounted 
for 8 percent of the detention bed days, trailing only Mexico, El Salvador, and Guatemala 
(36 percent, 11 percent, and 10 percent, respectively).34 Between fiscal year 2007 to 
                                                 
33 Blanchard, “Shifting Trends in Central American Migration,” 67. 
34 Alison Siskin, “Immigration-Related Detention Current Legislative Issues” (CRS Report for 
Congress, January 12, 2012), 12.       
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2009, 87,551 Hondurans were deported from the United States and of those an estimated 
17,833 were classified as “criminal deportees.”35 While many of the deportees do not 
merit the definition of criminal, a growing number do have violent pasts, prior felonies, 
and gang ties. By the time that some of these immigrants were deported from the United 
States, they had acquired backgrounds in criminal and gang activities. Complicating 
things further, the immigration laws that deported these gang members also prohibited 
U.S. officials from disclosing the criminal backgrounds of the deportees to their home 
countries.36 This was Central America’s version of Marielitos; in this instance, with the 
United States exporting criminals to its weaker allies without coordination or planning.  
These returning gang members gained a stronghold in Honduras.37 While 
deportations brought the Los Angeles gang culture to Honduras, deportations are not a 
major factor for the growth of maras in their continued prominence in the criminal 
landscape.38  
When the government initiated a zero-tolerance policy targeting gang members, 
the prison population skyrocketed. The deplorable prison conditions, where the well-
being of the inmates is of little consequence, simply added to the problem. The food, 
health, and sleeping quarters are a source of daily contestation among the inmate 
population and the prison administrators and guards. In an anthropological study of gangs 
in the city of El Progreso, Department of Yoro, Misael Castro and Marlon Carranza 
reveal how prisoners often joined gangs to survive. Prison super-gangs are composed of 
smaller clikas (cliques, sets, ranging from a few to 40 members). These prison subgroups 
interacted with cliques from other barrios belonging to their affiliated super-gang, 
creating national networks.  
                                                 
35 Steven S. Dudley, “Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America Transportistas, Mexican 
Cartels and Maras,” in Eric L. Olson et al., Shared Responsibility U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for 
Confronting Organized Crime (Washington, DC; San Diego, CA: Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars, Mexico Institute; University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010), 83. 
36 Kevin Lewis O’Neill, “Delinquent Realities Christianity, Formality, and Security in the Americas,” 
American Quarterly 63, no. 2 (2011): 341. 
37 Mateo, “Street Gangs of Honduras,” 93. 
38 Bruneau, Maras Gang Violence and Security in Central America, 14. 
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With the MS-13 and 18th Street members incarcerated in the same prison, 
controlling territory inside the prisons became key for survival and power. Gang 
members became closer to the gang as they were more dependent on them for protection. 
Where the street became the initiation for gang indoctrination, prisons intensified that 
experience as critical for survival. Prisons, in part, shaped the development of gang 
members inside and outside their walls.39 How much influence the imprisoned gang 
leaders have over the activities of their clikas and homies outside of prison, is unclear. El 
Salvador has worked to negotiate gang truce, an experiment that has in part reduced the 
homicide rate by 40 percent in 2012.40 The truce was brokered by religious leaders, local 
government and the international community. In May 2013, Honduras had a truce 
agreement, but the results have been negligible. Part of the explanations for the variance 
is that gangs in Honduras are not as hierarchical as Salvadoran gangs, therefore gang 
leaders do not have the same influence.41 Moreover, the criminal landscape in El 
Salvador is not as affected by the drug trade and Salvadoran institutions are among the 
most trusted and strongest in Central America.   
Another major area of recent study is the increase of drug trafficking through 
Central America. According to the Department of State statistics, cocaine coming into the 
United States via Central America rose in volume from 1 percent in 2007 to 95 percent in 
2010.42 The numbers reflect the preference of drug traffickers to use the land-based route, 
short aerial flights, and maritime littoral of Central America. In Honduras, the numerous 
ports, clandestine air strips, and established land routes to Guatemala make it an ideal 
transit for traffickers. Drug traffickers utilize the same infrastructure used for most of the 
nation’s legal trade. San Pedro Sula, where a large concentration of criminality takes 
place, was also the source of two-thirds of the Honduras GDP in 1999.43  
                                                 
39 Misael Castro and Marlon Carranza, “Las Maras en Honduras Maras y Pandillas en Centroamérica 
Vol. I (2001): 298; Universidad de Centroamérica, accessed June 3, 2013, 
http//www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/libros/libromarasypandillasencentroamericavol.I.pdf. 
40 UNODC, 2013 Global Study On Homicide, 34. 
41 Ibid., 46. 
42 Cited in Nigel Inkster and Virginia Comolli, Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States The Problems of 
Prohibition (New York: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), 98. 
43 Inkster and Comolli, Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States, 98. 
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Julie Bunck and Michael Fowler note that Honduras has always been “poverty-
stricken” but the manner in which the Honduran drug trade has evolved remains largely 
unexplored.44 Part of the explanation for the lack of research is due to the role the 
military plays in police functions, bringing into question the validity of the military and 
police reports. According to Bunck and Fowler, the Honduran armed forces have 
influenced the evolution of the drug trade in Honduras. In charge of policing the airports 
and ports, the armed forces have been linked to drug traffickers at least since the 1970s. 
Despite cases brought against military officers, few have been convicted, and even in the 
rare instance this happens, their sentences are reduced or their convictions are 
overturned.45  
Ricardo Maduro was elected president of Honduras in 2001, after a campaign in 
which he promised to get tough on crime. Maduro’s policies began with zero tolerance, 
policies carried out by police in crime-ridden areas. In 2003, mano dura—anti-gang 
repressive policies, meaning “strong fist” or “strong hand”—were introduced, adding to 
zero tolerance by targeting members of the maras.46 Tough policing was followed by 
legislative action with the passage of the reform of article 332 of the penal code, known 
as Ley Antimaras. Under this anti-gang law, membership in street gangs became a crime, 
with punishment ranging up to fines of $10,000 and nine years in prison.47 
Despite initial success in reducing criminality, the long-term results of mano dura 
have been disastrous. The homicide rate has nearly tripled, and gangs have surged in 
numbers, and become more violent. Moreover, organized crime operates freely, largely 
unhindered. Nor do they suffer from a dearth of recruits. Death squads and sicarios 
(contract killers) have become part of the violent landscape. In addition, the police and 
military are alleged to take part in extrajudicial killing, and at the very minimum, turning 
a blind eye to the criminals. In 2002, according to Casa Alianza/ Covenant House, a NGO 
that works in rehabilitation and defense of street children, 556 youths under the age of 
                                                 
44 Bunck and Fowler. Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation, 258. 
45 Ibid., 308. 
46 Bruneau, Dammert, and Skinner, Maras Gang Violence and Security, 259. 
47 Gutierrez Rivera, Territories of Violence, 85. 
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twenty-three were assassinated. Carros de la muerte (death cars) allegedly killed 47 of 
them.48  
Earlier explanations for the problems of Honduras include the failed transition 
from authoritarian regime to a consolidated democracy. This view argues that this 
accounts for weak institutions and underdevelopment. Scholars have utilized cross-
national comparison to explain the divergent outcomes, and homicide rates are often the 
matrix most cited to measure the effectiveness of the state. In the case of Honduras, the 
question turns to how is it that a country that did not experience a civil war, like El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, has the highest levels of crime?49 The comparisons 
have revealed that the outcomes in Central America, and the Northern isthmus in 
particular, do not lead to a predictive outcome, based on the internal wars, transition to 
democracy, and neoliberal reforms. What is undisputed is that the Honduran security 
reality is bleak, with no improvement in sight. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will utilize a single case study of Honduras to analyze the state’s 
failure in public security and attempt to answer the proposed thesis question. It will 
utilize the sources outlined in the literature review, in addition to public documents on 
gangs and organized crime from government, non-governmental organizations relating to 
the region, and Honduras specifically. For statistical data, it will depend on international 
organizations, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Developmental Bank, the 
United Nations, and reputable educational and professional institutions conducting 
research in Honduras. It will also utilize the latest articles from the New York Times and 
Honduran media outlets and national newspapers.  
This thesis will seek to analyze the increase in violence and the Honduran 
government actions to combat it. First, it will analyze the major factors and actors 
responsible for the increase in violence. How has transnational organized crime affected 
                                                 
48 Adrienne Pine, Working Hard, Drinking Hard On Violence and Survival in Honduras (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2008), 57. 
49 Rodgers, “Joining the Gang and Becoming a Broder,” 445. 
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the violence levels in Honduras? How has corruption, impunity, and the weak 
institutional capacity exacerbated the problem? Second, this thesis will analyze the 
effectiveness of the government crime-fighting strategy, specifically militarization. The 
goal of this research is to explain the exponential rise of violence in Honduras, and 
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II. MILITARIZATION: THE STATE RESPONDS  
TO RISE IN VIOLENCE 
In one of his last acts before his presidential term expired in January 2014, 
President Porfirio Lobo signed legislation to create two new security forces: the TIGRES 
(Tropa de Inteligencia y Grupos de Respuesta Especial de Seguridad) and a Military 
Police for Public Order (Policía Militar de Orden Publico, PMOP). With the increase  
in violence and crime throughout Honduras, the last four Honduran presidential 
administrations have seen the country’s security situation deteriorate. The major 
questions that Hondurans pose are whether this current strategy will work, and whether 
these rebranded forces will be up to the daunting task of fighting the Honduran criminal 
element? For international observers and human rights activists, the creation of these 
units brings back memories of phases of militarization that many believe are to blame for 
the stunted development of the state and security forces. Indeed, this repeat militarize 
strategy is a desperate reaction to a situation that has reached crisis levels, and a 
population demanding that its government do something to reverse the trend. The 
concern is that the conceived strategy will further militarize the Honduran state, 
undermining democracy and due process of the law. This thesis argues that militarization 
of the Honduran political system in conjunction with the absence of comprehensive 
reforms to the criminal justice system is one of the major factors why Honduras has been, 
is, and most likely will continue to be in a security crisis. This chapter seeks to explain 
the tendency to use the armed forces and military-type units to curb violence, and the 
ramifications of using such units in a state where there is no culture of adhering to the 
rule of law. 
In presenting the issue of militarization, this chapter will utilize the development 
of militarization since the dictatorship of Tiburcio Carias Andino (1933–1948). First, it 
will provide an overview of militarization in Honduras. Second, it will analyze the 
creation and proposed operational and tactical use of TIGRES and PMOP. Third, it will 
look at the Honduran political history and how, since 1954, the armed forces have been 
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the ultimate state arbiter. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the limits of 
militarization when the rest of the crime-fighting system is broken.  
A. THE MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY 
Honduras has many problems. This poverty-stricken and crime-ridden nation has 
dealt with declining quality of life since the transition to democratic rule in 1981. Always 
poor, but historically more secure than its neighbors, Honduras is now in the bottom of 
most categories in a region characterized by internal wars, poverty and violence. Unable 
to fix the long-term problems of underdevelopment, Honduras has been incapable of 
providing its citizens with basic services and needs. Repeatedly, the military has been 
called on to resolve political differences between the two major political parties and, at 
present, they are the main state institution in charge of directing the war against crime. 
Kirk Bowman, in his examination of Honduras militarization in the period of 
1954–63, defines the term as “the expansion or relative size of some integral part, scope 
or mission of the armed forces, and may be observed in the size of the budget, number of 
soldiers, training, equipping, war readiness and institutionalization of the armed 
forces.”50 Militarization in the context of this chapter refers to the utilization of the armed 
forces and para-military units for public security and the expansion of their mission that 
includes training, equipping, and overseeing the strategic, operational, and tactical use of 
security forces. 
Raul Benitez and Arturo Sotomayor highlight that in the Mesoamerican region, 
comprised of Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica 
and Panama, the histories of the militaries are not forged in fighting external wars.51 The 
threat to the region has shifted from regional counterinsurgency conflicts to internal 
criminal gangs, and institutionalized corruption exacerbated in part by the increase in 
drug trafficking. The region’s security situation is primarily “intermestic,” where the 
                                                 
50 Kirk S. Bowman, “The Public Battles over Militarisation and Democracy in Honduras,” Journal of 
Latin American Studies 33, no. 3 (2001): 541. 
51 Raul Benitez and Arturo Sotomayor, “The Mesoamerican Dilemma External Insecurity, Internal 
Vulnerability,” in Paul Kenny, Mónica Serrano, and Arturo Sotomayor, Mexico’s Security Failure Collapse 
into Criminal Violence (New York: Routledge, 2012), 183. 
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causes of insecurity are internal but the effects are transnational. In this context, the 
actions of one government are fruitless, and the actions and inactions of other states can 
lead to further deterioration in security. While there is collaboration on some security 
aspects, especially near border towns, the region’s security apparatuses operate 
independently. According to Benitez and Sotomayor, this is due in part to the fact that  
the military have yet fully to accept civilian control and lack incentives for regional 
cooperation.52 
Honduras and El Salvador are the two countries in the region that have small 
border disputes. The consequence of their arming to resolve them simply increases the 
sense of insecurity in their neighbors who, in turn, are forced to respond in kind by 
augmenting their military arsenal.53 But apart from rival border claims of the Conejo 
Island off the Gulf of Fonseca and memories of the conflict of 1969 so called "Soccer 
War" and Cold War, militarization in Central America today does not arise principally 
from interstate conflict.  
B. TIGRES 
In Honduras, one problem is impunity. For instance, of the 7,172 homicides  
in 2012, only 982 resulted in detention and charges.54 The numbers demonstrate but  
one example of the problems caused by poor police recruitment, training, and capacity. In 
charge of covering 112,492 square kilometers, an area the approximate size of Tennessee, 
divided into 18 states (departamentos) and 298 municipalities, the police are 
overwhelmed (see Figure 4). Honduras has 151 police per 100,000 people, which is far 
below the recommended UN average of 280, and the international average of 225.55 
 
                                                 
52 Benitez and Sotomayor, “The Mesoamerican Dilemma,” 184. 
53 Ibid. 
54 RESDAL, “Public Security Index Central America Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Panama,” (2013), 88, www.resdal.org/ing.  
55 Daniel Sabet, “Police Reform in Mexico Advances and Persistent Obstacles,” in Eric L. Olson et 
al., Shared Responsibility U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime (Washington, DC; 
San Diego, CA; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute: University of San 
Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010), 248. 
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Figure 4.  Map of Honduras (from CRS, 2013)56 
The state’s new strategy to deal with the deteriorating situation is through the 
creation of an elite police force named TIGRES. This unit calls for the training and 
deployment of 300 or so members to patrol the cities of San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa. 
This unit, which falls under the Secretary of Security, was created to strengthen the 
national police. In 2013, Porfirio Lobo proposed expanding the national police to a total 
of 20,000, which would almost double the current manning of 12,805.57 But, with the 
inability to reform the police and the widespread corruption in police ranks, the initiative 
did not gain any traction.  
                                                 
56 Peter J. Meyer, Honduras-U.S. Relations (CRS Report for Congress July 24, 2013). 
57 RESDAL, “Public Security Index in Central America,” 99.  
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According to Marco Caceres, the creation of TIGRES brings back memories of 
former elite troop units in Honduras who were involved with extra-judicial killings and 
human rights abuses. In the 1980s, the Batallón 3–16 was responsible for the 
disappearance of many Hondurans, whose only alleged crime was to oppose state 
policies.58  
Another infamous unit of that era, and one that continues to operate today, is the 
Cobras. This Special Forces unit is utilized in Honduras in a similar fashion as the federal 
law enforcement teams in the United States. The Cobras developed a reputation for 
performing the most dangerous missions, generating both fear and respect among 
Hondurans. For instance, it was the Cobras, with the assistance of the DEA and U.S. 
Marshalls, that arrested famous Honduran drug lord Juan Matta Ballesteros in 1988.59 In 
2009, Cobras caught Fredy Donaldo Marmol Vallejo, alleged leader of the Northern 
cartel, who had evaded authorities for years.60 
Yet, because Cobra type units are secretive, only members in the ranks or in 
command of the security forces and national defense know the missions they conduct. In 
that context, the fear is that these units may turn the very skills agents deploy to go after 
notorious criminals that the regular police cannot handle to neutralize government 
opponents.  
In 1998, the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights (CODEH) reported 
that the practice of killing civilians by the military, police, and death squads outside the 
purview of the law remained alive. The CODEH cited that 701 people had been killed 
since 1990; many of the bodies found in fields were mutilated and showed signs of 
torture.61  
                                                 
58 Pine, Working Hard, Drinking Hard, 57. 
59 Bunck and Fowler, Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation, 280. 
60 Ibid., 290. 
61 Pine, Working Hard, Drinking Hard, 57. 
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Oscar Martinez, a reporter for El Faro online newspaper, describes police agents 
in Honduras as “macho cops.”62 Martinez wrote a story about his ride-along experience 
with the Honduran police along the border town near El Paraíso. The police chief in 
charge of the operation was Juan Carlos Bonilla Valladares, better known as El Tigre (see 
Figure 5). El Tigre personifies the militant view of the Honduras law enforcement and its 
problems. Bonilla was accused in 2002 by the Honduras police internal affairs section of 
taking part in a police death squad unit called Los Magníficos. After the head of the 
internal affairs, Maria Luisa Borjas was relieved of her duties before finishing the 
investigation, El Tigre was found innocent—his only sanction a $5,000 fine. When 
Martinez asked El Tigre whether he had “ever killed someone outside the framework of 
the law,” El Tigre’s response became famous in Honduras: “There are things a person 
takes to his grave. All I can say is that I love my country and I will do whatever it takes to 
defend it, and I have done things to defend it. That’s all I’ll say.”63  
 
Figure 5.  Juan Carlos Bonilla Valladares, better known as El Tigre  
(from NY Times, 2013) 
Martinez was perplexed when his article in which Bonilla never denies 
wrongdoing, was used to propel Bonilla to become the top cop in Honduras. The macho 
attitude matters in Honduras, and most public leaders and security officials repeatedly 
                                                 




display that type of demeanor. The name for the new unit and the nickname of Bonilla is 
not a coincidence—it was during his tenure that the concept and the laws to create it were 
passed. 
The creation of the TIGRES was, in part, because of the perception that the 
Honduran police are largely corrupt and neither able nor willing to tackle the serious 
insecurity in the country. In fact, many Honduras allege that the police look the other way 
and even take part in committing crimes. Cases of police cover-ups, extra-judicial 
killings, and old-fashioned corruption are daily stories in Honduran news outlets. In 
2012, 84 percent of Honduras surveyed expressed little or no trust in the police.64  
A central aspect of the problem is low police salaries, even in the aftermath of 
police reforms. Prior to the latest wage increase, the average monthly salary for a 
policeman was $350, with some receiving even less. This is barely the minimum monthly 
wage. Currently, the average salary for 83.2 percent of the force is $472. For officers  
(8.1 percent of the force) in the positions of inspection, executive and superior, the 
average monthly salary is $734, $1,494, and $2,261, respectively.65 
C. PMOP 
While the TIGRES is a small elite unit aimed at strategic targets, PMOP is a 
supposed to be a bridge between the police and the military (see Figure 6). The unit in 
concept is a hybrid force, to be trained and quartered by the armed forces. To speed up 
the process, the first 1,000 members came directly from the military ranks. Since then, 
the PMOP is recruited by combination of Soldiers and new recruits. The target strength is 
5,000 members by the end of 2014.  
                                                 




Figure 6.  PMOP in Colonia Flor del Campo of Comayagüela  
(from El Heraldo.hn, 2014) 
According to the commanders of the armed forces in charge of the training and 
utilization, PMOP officers are selected from the best members of the military, and the 
selection criteria call for minimum requirements for height and a sixth-grade education. 
These new agents must also undergo psychological testing and pass a polygraph test. 
With the police unable to deal with violence, and the military constitutionally constrained 
from performing a policing role, the PMOP is the state’s latest answer.  
Recent police reforms include making it mandatory for all members of the police 
to go through vetting. As a result, several officers were dismissed, while some left 
voluntarily. But the constitutionality of the reform was brought to the Supreme Court, 
who declared that the reform violated the officer’s due process. The decision of the 
judges was viewed as another obstacle by the leaders in parliament and the executive, 
who then suspended the judges.  
The issue of military police was a hotly debated topic in the recent November 
presidential election. In January 27, 2014 Juan Orlando Hernandez was officially sworn 
for a four-year term as the President of Honduras. A candidate from the Partido Nacional 
and the president of the Congress, President Orlando Hernandez ran on a platform of 
security and jobs, with the creation of the PMOP as a major part of his strategy to fight 
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crime. The popular support, in part, helped the PN regain the presidential palace again. 
An August 2013 poll, conducted by Honduran firm Paradigma, cited that 70 percent of 
the people supported the creation of the policía militar.66 
For the new members of the policía militar, the government has put in several 
incentives. Once selected, the new agents receive a 100 percent increase of their basic 
military monthly salary and an additional 20 percent bonus for good performance. The 
added salary is on top of the popular support the units have received during public 
displays, and in the barrios and cities to which the first 1,000 agents have been sent. 
There is no criterion that has been made public as to what constitutes good performance. 
Nor is the oversight process of the PMOP clear. With Colombia’s false-positive scandal 
in mind, which is seen as a result of an ill-conceived incentive structure that rewarded 
questionable at best and even criminal activity at the worst, Hondurans are aware of the 
possible side effects. 
For academics who have studied Honduras and Latin America, militarization is 
not a new concept. It is almost a déjà-vu. In the Honduran case, Kirk Bowman examined 
the process of militarization in Honduras from 1954 to 1963. At that time, the debate 
centered on whether Honduras needed to have a military. Costa Rica was in the process 
of eliminating the military as an institution and Hondurans were discussing doing the 
same. But 1954 brought critical events that shaped the future of Honduras: the great 
banana strike, the utilization of Honduran territory to launch an invasion against 
Guatemalan President Arbenz, and the United States and Honduras’s signing of the 
Bilateral Treaty of Military Assistance.67 The existence of the Honduran military and its 
role in internal and regional conflict was shaped from thereafter. In 1952, with the help of 
the United States, the Francisco Morazán Military Academy produced its first officers.  
The problems of today have changed little. The lessons from the past reveal that 
militarization weakened state capacity by challenging the executive and legislative 
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authority. Moreover, it weakened and undermined the judiciary and budgetary process.68 
Unfortunately, it further tilted the power relations to the elites, a divide that remains alive 
today.  
J. Mark Ruhl studied the civil military relations in Honduras. He says that in 1996 
most Latin American armed forces had returned to their barracks, while retaining 
significant political and institutional autonomy.69 The militaries were granted broad 
jurisdiction over internal security and were left largely free of civilian interference. The 
inability of civilians to force the armed forces to submit to democratic control resulted in 
the belief that the democratic system survived at the sufferance of the military. This has 
been the case in Honduras, which until 1998 had begun to see their power challenged.  
The low economic development ($637 GDP per capita in 1996), and high degree 
of political dominance exercised by the Honduras armed forces, have contributed to a 
lack of institutionalized civilian tradition in the country’s politics from the early 1960s 
through the 1980s when civilian rule was reestablished once again.70  
Ruhl argued in 1996 that despite the power of the Honduran armed forces at that 
time, their position was already eroding. The lack of security threats in the region, 
changes in U.S. foreign, policy and transformation in the Honduran society provided 
grounds for optimism that the country may become less militarized.71 That changed, 
however, when criminality began to rise in the late 1990s and when Maduro, from the 
PN, took office the profile of the armed forces was raised once again.  
D. AN HISTORICAL TAKE ON THE MILITARY 
Since independence, Honduran politicians have been in a constant struggle for 
money, power, and patronage. The constitution and rules established were often ignored 
                                                 
68 Bowman, “The Public Battles over Militarisation and Democracy in Honduras,” 560. 
69 J. Mark Ruhl, “Redefining Civil-Military Relations in Honduras,” Journal of Inter-American 
Studies and World Affairs 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 33. 
70 Ibid., 34 
71 Ibid., 34.  
 27
or not enforced. The military came into the political scene only after the mid-1950s, when 
a professional military institution was born. 
The creation of the military as an institution began during the dictatorship of 
Tiburcio Carias Andino (1933–1948). With the assistance of the United States, schools 
for basic training began instructing officers and enlisted personnel in the 1940s. In 1954, 
the same year that the U.S.-Honduran military signed a bilateral treaty, the armed forces 
organic law defined the mission as defense of national sovereignty and public order. 
The military intervened in the political arena several times after 1954. They 
ousted Julio Lozano in 1956, after he had seized power when the National Party-
controlled congress prevented Liberal Party candidate Galvez from taking office. The 
military subsequently relinquished power to Ramon Villeda Morales in 1957. Under his 
command Honduras passed laws on social security, labor, and agrarian sector as well as 
signing the Central American Common Market (CACM) accord. In addition to facing the 
challenges of developing the poorest country in Central America, Villeda had to contend 
with a series of attempted coups by elements of the national police and military, 
prompting his decision to disband the police and create the Guardia Civil to reduce the 
power of the military.72 
After political campaigning in early1963, in which Liberal candidate Modesto 
Rodas Alvarado promised to end the constitutional autonomy of the armed forces, the 
National party and the military carried out a coup in March 1963. The coup enabled the 
armed forces to abolish the Guardia Civil and make the Honduran military the country’s 
most powerful political force. From 1963 to 1971, Air Force General Oswaldo Lopez 
Arellano ruled Honduras in collaboration with Ricardo Zuniga Agustinus of the National 
party. Under their command, a new national police force—the Cuerpo Especial de 
Seguridad (CES)—was established. This fourth branch of the military was used to repress 
and silence opponents and to shore up the administration’s power.73  
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Popular resentment of the military emerged as a result of fraudulent elections in 
1968, followed by the defeat of the Honduran military in the 1969 “Soccer War” against 
El Salvador. In 1971, labor organizations and business groups successfully pressured 
Lopez to make way for a bipartisan government. General Lopez, however, retained 
command of the 8,000 strong military.74  
Honduran groups that formed in the late 1950s and 1960s—peasant, private 
sector, and reformist labor unions—did not find that the traditional parties represented 
their interest. The bipartisan government of national unity became divided, mired in 
corruption, and unable to enact social reforms. In 1972, General Lopez imposed a 
military government with him in charge, and aligned the goals of the new regime 
according to the new populist agenda, which included expanding the role of government 
and agrarian reform.75  
The support enabled General Lopez to grow the size of the military to 18,500 and 
he personally monopolized power within the institution. In 1975, Colonel Juan Melgar 
Castro took command after General Lopez was forced to relinquish authority of the 
armed forces due to the increased concern over his power. Later that year an internal 
coup ousted General Lopez from the presidency as well after alleged charges of 
corruption against him for accepting bribes from United Brands in exchange for a 
reduction in the banana export tax. Colonel Juan Melgar became president and Colonel 
Policarpo Paz Garcia the chief of the armed forces. These conservatives and military 
hard-liners ended the military’s intervention in populist reforms. In 1978, Paz Garcia 
overthrew Melgar via another coup.76 By this time, the military had lost much of its 
public support and private sector support, after yet more allegations of corruption and bad 
economic policies surfaced.  
Despite the political factionalism, and military division, and the lack of economic 
progress, in contrast to the 1980s and thereafter, “there were no death squads, no 
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systematized tortures, and no rash of disappearances,” while the press remained relatively 
free.77 This period also coincided with the fall of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 
1979, and pressures from the United States for armed forces to leave power. 
The military negotiated certain privileges prior to relinquishing political power. 
They retained veto over cabinet appointments, control over internal and external security 
policy, and perhaps more importantly for shaping the future development, no 
investigations of the military to include corruption or human rights violations occurred.78 
The military retained autonomy of the selection process of the head of the armed forces 
and the president could not name or remove the commander. The Consejo Superior de las 
Fuerzas Armadas (CONSUFFAA) composed of heads of the Army, Air Force and Navy, 
submitted a list of three names from which Congress made its selection.  
The military grew stronger as a result of military aid from Washington, which 
increased from $3.9 million in 1980 to $77.5 million in 1984,79 totaling $174 million 
between 1981 and 1985, in exchange for assistance against the counterinsurgency in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador.80 In total, the United States provided over $1.6 billion in 
military and economic aid to Honduras in the 1980s.81 
General Gustavo Alvarado Martinez, trained in Argentina as a cadet, applied 
“dirty war” tactics he learned there against anyone suspected of communism. The special 
unit Batallón 3–16, the Dirección Nacional de Investigaciones (DNI), and Fuerzas de 
Seguridad Publica (FUSEP) used torture and acted as death squads to eliminate alleged 
Honduran communists and guerilla sympathizers. At that time, labor, student, and 
peasant organizations were prime targets of these units. The death squads, which by 1983 
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also included Nicaraguan exiles, made political disappearances and murders 
commonplace.82  
Civilian leaders and a fearful population were no match for the armed forces on 
the one hand, yet did not oppose measures that gave the military more power and 
autonomy. The biggest challenge came from within the institution. In 1984, General 
Alvarez was ousted through an internal coup, and the new leadership began to question 
Honduran assistance to the contras and the use of Honduras as a training ground for 
Salvadoran military. From the early 1950s through 1979, more than 1,000 Honduran 
personnel received U.S. training in counterinsurgency and “national security.”83 The size 
of the Honduran military grew to 26,000 in 1986 and became better trained as a result of 
joint U.S. training exercises (see Figure 7). The military stepped in after President Suazo 
Cordova sought to remain in power past the one-term limit. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Honduras Armed Forces (after J. Ruhl, 1996, and RESDAL 2013). 
In 1986 CONSUFAA replaced Lopez Reyes with General Humberto Regalado 
Hernandez. Hernandez tolerated and allegedly encouraged corruption. He was alleged to 
have stolen large sums of public money for his personal use, as well as becoming 
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involved in the international drug trade.84 Because of prior arrangements providing the 
military autonomy from civilian intervention into its internal affairs, military personnel 
engaged in drug trafficking and human right abuses in the full knowledge that they could 
not be prosecuted. It can be argued, the impunity problems that Honduras suffers from 
today stem from this era when neither public officials nor the military were called to 
account. 
Mark Rosenberg states that in the government of Liberal Jose Azcona de Hoyo 
(1986–1990), it was the military and the U.S. Embassy who negotiated security and 
foreign policy issues directly. Throughout the 1980s, the civilian politicians were 
factionalized, weak, and often relied upon the military to arbitrate their disputes.85 In 
1985, congress dismissed five of the nine Supreme Court judges for alleged corruption. 
Their true intent, however, was to stack the court to their benefit because it held the 
decision to nominate the president should a majority vote of 50 percent of the popular 
vote not take place. The military had to step in and brokered an agreement that gave the 
presidency to Azcona despite the fact that he received fewer votes (27.5 percent) than PL 
candidate Rafael Leonardo Callejas (42.6 percent). The terms of the agreement gave 
Azcona the presidency because the PN candidates received 51.6 percent of the vote 
combined and he had the majority among them.86  
One of the major questions today is why Honduras, which did not have an  
internal war, has so many crime problems? In this context of the political divisions, the 
intervention of external interests, and military rule, a second important question to ask is 
why Honduras did not evolve a revolutionary movement as did its neighbors. In fact, “in 
the 1960s, Honduras gave birth to the most militant and, before long, the best-organized 
peasant movement in Central America.”87 Moreover, in the mid-1980s, it was estimated 
                                                 
84 Ruhl, “Redefining Civil-Military Relations in Honduras,” 39. 
85 Mark B. Rosenberg, “Narcos and Politicos The Politics of Drug Trafficking in Honduras,” Journal 
of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 1988, 152. 
86 Leonard, The History of Honduras, 165. 
87 Steven Volk, “Honduras: On the Border of War,” in Trouble in Our Backyard: Central America and 
the United States in the Eighties, edited by Martin Diskin (New York: Pantheon, 1983), 203–243. Quoted 
in Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 171. 
 32
that four main guerrilla organizations operated in Honduras with a membership totaling 
about six hundred people. Jeff Goodwin argues that the Honduran relatively “semi-
openness” of the military regimes beginning in the 1960s and most importantly the 
moderate military rule of the 1970s that sought to enact land reform are major reasons 
why revolutionary movements there never got off the ground.88  
According to J. Mark Ruhl, during the 1990s four major developments 
undermined the position of the military. First, the end of the Cold War and removal of 
communism as a real or inflated threat prompted the questioning of the size of the 
military. Second, the U.S. policy change toward accepting the allegations against the 
military as a corrupt institution resulted in Washington calling for the reduction of the 
military budget. Third, civil society became more engaged and organizations previously 
repressed began to exposed military wrongdoing. Fourth, the private sector, one of the 
strongest groups in Honduran civil society, changed from a supporter of the military to 
one of its major critics.89  
E. CONCLUSION 
In sum, do desperate times call for desperate measures? The answer to this 
question may not lie on the long-term effect of the new security paradigm in Honduras. 
There is a shortage of innovation and creative ideas in the country. Unfortunately, the 
inability to control the criminal sector has made the majority of the population 
accomplices to the re-militarization of society. According to Buck and Fowler, the 
Honduran military, with their privileged position in society, have enjoyed the freedom to 
act without consequence.90  
A major reason for opting to use the military and create TIGRES and policía 
militar are the organized crime elements in Honduras. Drug traffickers and transnational 
criminal organizations (TCOs) are overpowering state authorities. Often, the criminals 
have more firepower, better logistics, or just simply corrupt or coerce anyone to take part 
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in their business. Numerous articles printed and news outlets of Latin America, Europe, 
Al Jazeera, among others, have run stories about how Honduras is at the mercy of the 
gangs and drug traffickers.  
Furthermore, the shift of drug trafficking routes has made Honduras the  
latest battleground. The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report estimates that  
79 percent of the cocaine that makes its way from South America to North America every 
year—that is $30 billion of the $38 billion—passes through Honduras. This amount  
is approximately ten times as high as the Honduran state budget and more than the  
$18 billion national GDP.91 
The utilization of these forces raises more questions than answers. In part, that is 
one of the reasons why the legislation creating the policía militar was questioned on the 
constitutional level, requiring 85 percent votes from the opposition to reform the law.  
In the meantime, the police remain mostly unreformed. The Tigres have yet to 
materialize significant results, and the population remains hopeful that PMOP can 
provide desperately needed security. Most Hondurans today are in agreement with the 
executive to do whatever is necessary to curb the violence in the country. But, in addition 
to losing momentum in reforming the police, so has the call to strengthen and depoliticize 
the judiciary.  
Efforts to strengthen the judicial system has lagged behind and not addressed the 
threats from criminal actors. Without addressing the judicial system, the effects of the 
new reforms will likely fail because the public is unable to see direct and long-term 
benefits from the security reforms while crimes go unsolved and unpunished. 
The questions remain: does the militarization threaten Honduran democracy? Is 
the nation going back to a period where the military played a major role in ruling the 
country? Does adding these units undermine the PNC and the criminal justice system? Is 
the government at risk that one of the few trusted institutions in the country can succumb 
to corruption and commit human rights abuses? 
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With desperation in the air, new leadership in the executive, a congress that calls 
for reform but which is hamstrung by limited resources, once again the military has 
become the ultimate arbiter. The military is perhaps the last and only institution in 
Honduras with significant trust among the population and the firepower to fight against 
well-armed criminals. That trust will be challenged once the new agents hit the streets to 



















III. MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CRIMINAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
What is the best way to test the hypothesis of causes of crime in Honduras; where 
to begin? One of the ways to reach a greater understanding of the Honduran security 
problem is through exhausting the possible leads and testing most of the logical 
hypothesis. The first chapter describes numerous explanations offered by the literature for 
the increased of violence in Honduras. The options varied from the failure of 
neoliberalism to family fragmentation, poverty to institutional weakness. This chapter 
will deconstruct the question at hand beginning with the major factors explaining the 
increased in violence: transnational organized crime and the different elements associated 
with it. The study of transnational organized crime ties together drug trafficking, criminal 
gangs, state weakness, institutional capacity, corruption and impunity. On the one hand, 
Honduran elected leaders and the Orlando Hernandez administration directs the blame to 
organized crime; on the other one hand, activists, NGOs and many organizations bring 
attention to social ills, inequality and government corruption as the real reason for 
Honduras top ranking in the global homicide (see Table 2). This chapter addresses these 
main view points, and utilizing literature on these topics in other cases and regions, seeks 
to provide context into the Honduran problem. It is the argument of this thesis that 
Honduras security collapse is mainly a result of unresolved internal factors—political, 
economic, and societal—as well as the influence of foreign factors and actors—the 
evolution of the global illicit trade. Concentrating on some of these factors is not to 
dismiss other explanations, but it demonstrates that these are the factors shaping the 
current criminal landscape. 
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Table 2.   Top 10 Highest Homicides per 100,000 People in 2010  
(from UNODC, 2010). 
Two of the most important areas affecting public security in Honduras are the 
challenges posed by transnational organized crime and the relative weakness and fragility 
of the Honduran state to provide basic needs and security to the population. The most 
effective way of introducing this section’s main argument is by splitting the two concepts 
into their individual components. The first discusses the threat that transnational 
organized crime presents to Honduras and the global community. How has transnational 
organized crime evolved and how are criminals “hijacking” the global economy? The 
second section considers various aspects of state fragility to demonstrate how the net sum 
of these factors has affected the development of Honduras. Furthermore, it seeks to 
answer the major obstacles preventing Honduras to change its path of “progress-
resistant” state with a history of weak society, and a breakdown in the rule of law. This 
study contributes to the analyses of the major factors increasing violence in Honduras and 
to the broader discussion about the prospects of strategy in combatting transnational 
crime and the challenges of insecurity.  
The strength of the state lies in its ability to exert social control, the ability of  
the state to get people in the society to do what regime leaders want. The strength is 
measured by resistance to private pressure, and the capacity to change private behavior 
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and the social structure in intended ways. The weaker a state is in these categories, the 
stronger the society is and vice-versa. In this correlation, the structures of society affect 
the state capability. Social and political change in the Third World has downplayed the 
role of domestic conflict and who gets to decide who makes the rules.92 The capacity 
building then resides in the ability to exert social control and extract resources. These 
abilities have been exclusive to the military and elites in Honduras, with minimal societal 
resistance. The rise of the criminal world financed by the resources of the illicit trade has 
brought to the surface the weakness and deficiency of the Honduran institutions and 
society. 
A. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 
Drug traffickers chose Honduras for a reason, exposing the state’s unresolved 
internal issues and weak foundations. In other words, Honduras is not a “criminal’s 
paradise” by accident. The conditions in Honduras are ripe to conduct illicit operations. 
How so? Why now and not before? 
The Northern Triangle of Central America—Honduras, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador—is often linked for its breakdown into criminal violence. These three countries 
have suffered from increased homicide rates for over the last 25 years. In the current 
context of criminal environment, another grouping offers a better explanation for the 
increase in violence in Honduras. For Honduras, the group that explains the current 
violent landscape includes the United States, Colombia and Mexico. 
The development of the drug trade and changes in organizations and distribution 
has created a so called "balloon effect" that has significantly altered the Central American 
criminal environment, and that of Honduras in particular.93 First, the partial success of 
the drug effort in the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru and in Bolivia shifted production to 
Colombia. Cocaine was a legal small trade in forsaken corners in the Andes, becoming an 
                                                 
92 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in 
the Third World (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1988), 31. 
93 Bruce Bagley, “Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas Major Trends in the 
Twenty-First Century,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program 
(August 2012), 1. 
 38
illicit commodity in the 1950s. Pressure from the United States shifted the wholesale 
trade to Colombia and then to Northern Mexico.94  
The rise in Colombian cocaine in the 1970s and 1980s, and the influence of the 
Medellin and Cali cartels to orchestrate the trade to reach U.S. markets, began thereafter. 
The war in Central America facilitated narcotics trafficking throughout the region as each 
side in the conflict sought ways to fund its particular cause.95 In addition, the partial 
success of the war on drugs in Colombia and the dismantling of large hierarchal DTOs 
created a void that was quickly filled by Mexican cartels in the 1990s. Colombian 
organized crime expanded the cocaine trade via Mexico through Cuban-born trafficker 
Alberto Falcon and Honduran criminal Juan Matta Ballesteros. With networks of 
distribution in Mexico and the United States, police protection, and plenty of willing 
participants, Mexicans began smuggling cocaine in 1975 (see Figure 8).96 
 
Figure 8.  Major Global Cocaine Flows in 2008  
(from UNODC World Drug Report, 2010). 
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The Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center identifies the 
Mexican TCOs as the number one supplier, trafficker, and wholesale distributor of illicit 
drugs in the United States. The Colombian, Asian, Dominican, Cuban, and Western 
African TCOs have a smaller share of the market. Of the Mexican TCOs, the Sinaloa 
cartel is the most powerful and most complex in their economic model. After the fall of 
the Medellin and Cali cartels and proliferation of others, the Mexican cartels have utilized 
their proximity to the United States to seize control of the drug trade. The Sinaloa, Zetas, 
Gulf, Juarez, Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO), La Familia Michoacana (LFM), and the 
Tijuana cartels compete for the drug corridors.  
The competition for territory and drug markets resulted in high levels of violence. 
The violence is concentrated in the northern cities of Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros, 
Reynosa, Tijuana, Sinaloa and Juarez. In 2009, 6,000 deaths along the Mexican side of 
the border were related to the fight over the control of the border. Juarez drug-related 
death toll reached 2,500 in 2009 and increased to 3,000 the following year and by 2011 
the 5-year total surpassed 9,000.97 Prior to San Pedro Sula claiming the title, Juarez was 
known as the most violent city in the world. 
Moreover, over 70,000 deaths since 2006 are attributed to the illicit trade. It is 
reported that drugs generate between $18 and $39 billion a year in profits for the 
Mexican cartels. The drug business is extremely lucrative, with 20 million users a month 
and 2.5 million perpetual users in the United States.98 The problem has become difficult 
to contain for Mexico—even with the world’s 11th-largest economy and a large capable 
military; it is not difficult to predict the outcome when these actors expand their 
operations to weaker nations in Central America. 
The rise in power of these DTOs prompted the response of the Mexican 
government to declare their own war against these groups. Mexico’s response to the 
threat has been the extensive use of its military. Under President Vicente Fox, Mexico 
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committed an average of 19,293 troops annually to battling drug trafficking. The figure 
increased to 45,000 during the Calderon administration. In 2009, the Army assigned 
48,750 men to combating narcotics organizations—with approximately one-quarter 
involved in joint operations with the Navy, the Federal Police, the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Homeland Security Department, and other 
agencies. The emphasis on the military produced mixed results. The National Defense 
Ministry (SEDENA) announced that between December 1, 2006, and late December 
2011, it had arrested 41,023 suspects, while killing 2,321 criminals.99  
The increased pressure from the Mexican government created the “cockroach 
effect,” where these groups dispersed and began to look for other regions and countries 
from which to expand operations.100 TCOs significantly increased drug trafficking 
throughout Central America, especially Honduras and Guatemala. According to the 
Department of State statistics, cocaine coming into the U.S. via Central America rose 
from 1 percent in 2007 to 95 percent in 2010.101  
Two of these countries that Mexican TCOs expanded to are Honduras and 
Guatemala. In this context, the combination of the partial success of the war on drugs by 
the United States in the Andes, rise of the Mexican cartel and their role in taking over 
transportation and distribution from Colombians, and Mexican President Felipe 
Calderon’s pressure to curb the TCOs influence has spillover into Honduras resulting in 
increased violence.102  
Mexico’s Zetas and Sinaloa cartels operate in Honduras. They use the wild 
Mosquito Coast for drug deliveries, intensifying their influence after the 2009 Honduran 
coup. “We are between those who consume drugs and those who produce them. 
Logically we are a corridor traffic,” stated Pompeyo Bonilla Reyes, Honduras former 
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security minister under President Lobo.103 The quantities that now passed through 
Central America and the amounts that these governments seize are extremely high. An 
estimated 200 metric tons of cocaine passed through Honduras in 2009.104 In 2000, 
Central American countries seized less cocaine than Mexico. In 2011, they captured  
12 times more than Mexico.105 The seizures are both a combination of the increased in 
traffic and the increase assistance from the United States Southern Command 
(USSOUTHCOM) and Northern Command (USNOTHCOM) to capture as much as 
possible before it gets to Mexico where it becomes extremely difficult to interdict.  
Honduras is the latest state to succumb to the blood trail that is often associated 
with illegal activity that generates huge profits. The profit generated from the global 
illicit trade threatens the security of states everywhere the criminal agents or groups 
operate. In 1988, the director of the International Monetary Fund, Michel Camdessus, 
estimated that the money laundering represented between 2 and 5 percent of the global 
economy. Surpassing Camdessus “beyond imagination” estimates, 2001 estimates place 
the figure of dirty money at up to 10 percent of global GDP.106 The continued expansion 
of the illicit trade in size, scope, and influence—prompted the strategy for the United 
States government to combat the threat and build international cooperation. The 
American President’s 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime defined 
the concept as 
those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate 
transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary 
and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while 
protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/ or violence, 
or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational 
organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or 
communication mechanisms...107 
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Explaining the emergence of the Honduran experience with transnational 
organized crime is relatively straightforward. Honduras, similarly to most states, has 
experienced the economic interdependence and globalization that on the one hand was 
seen as a stabilizing influence through the growth of licit economies has also led to the 
emergence and growth of drug trafficking and the illicit activity.108   
The global illicit trade is nothing new and has been part of the market economies 
since states empires agreed to trade among one another. However, the illicit trade of 
today is radically different than at any point in history. According to Moises Naim, 
economic and political shifts, as well as technological advances since the 1990s, have 
blurred the borders and decreased the power of governments to regulate or control what 
comes in or out of their territory.109  
Prior to the 1990s, most organized criminals operated in fixed hierarchies, with 
controlling leaders and rigid control measures. Since the early 1990s, these new criminals 
are operating in decentralized networks, multiple loosely linked cells, and continuously 
adapt as the market or opportunities arise.110 While some of the attention has focused on 
cartels and kingpins like Pablo Escobar and, recently, Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, they 
are only a footnote in a booming trade. The fact is that the illicit trade of today is bigger 
and beyond the capabilities of any single leader or entities. The trade is fast with a 
multitude of transactions, warehousing, transportation, front companies, marketing, 
distribution, emails, and wire transfers—impossible to control in an open global 
economy.111  
Further complicating matters, as the trade went global and the profits increased, 
so did the smugglers and traffickers political influence, leading to an increase in global 
crime. According to the UNODC, in 2009 TCOs generated an estimated $870 billion or 
about 1.5 percent of the global gross domestic product. According to Havocscope—a 
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website that tracks global black market data—money laundering is valued at $2.5 trillion, 
the global black market valued was estimated at $1.82 trillion, with organized crime 
valued at $322 billion, and bribery and corruption valued at $1.6 trillion.112 More money 
combined with the corruption rampant in almost every governmental and political 
institution in the country for most of the history of Honduras has created the conditions 
for the severe security crises.  
In the Americas, examples of the consequences of powerful TCOs have already 
taken place. Colombia and Peru provide insight of the combination of illicit trafficking 
funding armed non-state actors to conduct terrorists’ acts. The Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- FARC), Auto 
Defensas de Colombia (AUC, self-defense forces of Colombia,) and in Peru with the 
shining path—drug money provided these groups a great source of financing for their 
violent criminal activity. In 2003, the Colombian government estimated that the FARC 
earned $783 million in cocaine revenue alone.113 
Whereas borders play a significant role for states and their sovereignty, for 
criminals these artificial barriers bring opportunities and provide protection from more 
capable states that can target them. In this context, states are at disadvantage when 
chasing after criminals across borders. According to Moisés Naim, the privileges and 
constraints of borders is making criminals difficult to capture and is causing governments 
everywhere to lose.114  
The ability of transnational criminals to circumvent laws and evade authorities 
represents severe consequences for the security of the states in the region. These 
criminals are using the same infrastructure and networks that legitimate businesses and 
governments use for trade.  
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Thus far, criminal networks have mostly utilized the infrastructure in the 
Americas for generating profit. As technology is more accessible and globalization 
creates opportunities, society has become more vulnerable. International networks have 
become more elaborate among organized crime, drug traffickers, arms dealers, and 
money launderers, leading to a dramatic increase in the threat they pose and the trail of 
blood left behind. Organized crime has incorporated Honduras as a spoke of operations, 
and with the possibility of becoming a hub.  
1. Drug Trafficking in Honduras 
Honduras has problems generated by the increased in drug trafficking. The drug 
trafficking and nexus to crime, however, is less certain. According to Honduran President 
Juan Carlos Hernandez, about 8 out of 10 murders in Honduras are related to drugs. With 
that in mind, the government has made fighting organized crime the top priority to reduce 
the homicides and violence in the country. Are drug traffickers responsible for the 
increase in violence? How does it manifest across the country and what has made it such 
a major threat as the government claims? 
A month into taking office, President Juan Orlando Hernandez praised Colombian 
cooperation with Honduras in the security arena. Orlando Hernandez publicly 
acknowledged that the support that the administration of Colombian President Juan 
Manuel Santos gave to Honduras in their pursuit of the passage of the law that would 
allow the military to shoot down planes that enter Honduran airspace without 
authorization was the type of alliances his country seeks. The praise to Colombia was 
also presumably a show of disdain toward the United States, which has publicly 
expressed its reservations about such a law. In February, William Brownfield—Assistant 
Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs responsible 
for the State Department programs to combat illicit drugs and organized crime115—stated 
                                                 
115 U.S. Department of State, accessed March 3, 2014, http//www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/154184.htm. 
 45
his concerns during an interview to a Honduran television station that the possibility of 
shooting down an innocent plane may hurt the long-term fight against drug trafficking.116  
The concern of aerial trafficking expands over three decades. Over the years, with 
accumulated experience and increased success and profits, the frequency and amount has 
also increased. Flights from Venezuela make up the majority of illicit flight to Honduras 
and typical shipments of 200–300 kilos have nearly double that amount. In 2009, a 
Russian Antonov 14 cargo plane from Venezuela was believed to have carried 3.7 tons of 
cocaine into the country.117 Hundreds of unidentified planes were crossing Honduras 
airspace, some carrying as much as 100 tons of cocaine. The practice is so profitable that 
smugglers often purposely crash the planes or set them on fire.118 
The legislature passed the decree in March shortly after Israeli radars purchased in 
2013 began to arrive in Honduras. Prior to the new radars, Honduras relied mostly on the 
support of the United States to monitor its territory.119 Assistance often comes from U.S. 
planes operating from the Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) at Soto Cano airbase, located 
45 minutes from Tegucigalpa and radars near Trujillo.120  
Honduran drug trafficking resembles the challenges of other bridge states. Most 
of the narco planes use Honduras to drop off the illicit product and as a refueling point. 
When the cargo is dropped off, the product is handled by different traffickers and 
transportistas in Guatemala, Belize, and Mexico and to the ultimate destination in the 
United States (see Figure 9). The cargo is mostly transported by boats and ground 
transport. When the practice of in-kind payments was instituted by Colombian and 
Mexican traffickers, it created a domestic market in Honduras that previously did not 
exist. Gang members in the 1970s and 1980s used to get drunk and get high on glue, 
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better known for its brand name “Resistol.” Today, cocaine and marijuana are the 
stimulants of choice. 
 
Figure 9.  Honduras Drug Trafficking Routes (from UNODC, 2012). 
Honduran narco entrepreneurs lacking the logistical capacity and network to 
transport the product to the United States began to market the product to Honduran 
buyers in the largest cities. That made criminal gangs major players in the illicit trade. To 
get the funds, gangs began to commit robberies, extortions, home invasions, and 
carjackings to raise the money to purchase the drugs and guns. Once the money was 
raised, new customers were attracted by the offering of free samples; once these 
customers were hooked, they went back to the dealer who now had a customer base to 
sell to. For the customers who could not afford it, they began to steal from their homes, 
once that did not suffice petty thefts and robberies became commonplace. As the business 
has grown, gangs—which are characterized by their territorial nature—began fighting 
one another for control of the market and indiscriminate violence became the norm. 
While an estimated 80 percent of the drugs that reach the United States travel through 
Honduras, an increasing amount is staying in country. 
 47
In addition to more illicit drugs staying in country, there is also worrisome 
evidence that Honduras may also become a producer and processor. On January 31, 2014, 
the police found evidence of homegrown opium and marijuana. In a hard to reach area 
400 kilometers from Tegucigalpa, in the hamlet of La Cumbre, municipality of Iguala, 
the police discovered an area measuring 100 meters long by 40 meters wide, with 1,800 
opium poppy plants and 800 marijuana plants.121 Previously, the only place in Central 
America where opium poppies had been found was in El Petén, Guatemala. Opium paste 
is the raw material for making heroin, a highly addictive drug for which demand has 
increased.122 
2. Maras  
The study on Honduran violence is not extensive, and the study of maras is even 
less so. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, maras were labeled enemy number 
one by the state. Articles highlighted that maras constitute a sort of a new 
counterinsurgency in Central America, stating that they pose a threat to the country they 
inhabit and, because of their connections in the United States, are groups that TCOs and 
terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda could seek to form an alliance with.123 The hysteria 
of gangs was only outdone by the lack of research in the proliferation of gangs in 
Honduras and their nexus to crime.  
Thomas Bruneau has published one of the few books on maras and their nexus to 
public security in Central America. Bruneau found during his research that there was 
limited material on the subject. The major research generated was by Jose Miguel Cruz, 
Dennis Rodgers, and Sonja Wolf.124 Additionally, there have been micro-level qualitative 
studies done by Ailsa Winton in Guatemala, Mo Hume in El Salvador, and Rodgers in 
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Nicaragua.125 Ethnographic research has been almost non-existent due to the inherent 
risks that it brings researchers. One of the promising films and research was by 
filmmaker Christian Poveda, but his 2008 documentary La Vida Loca126 portraying the 
way of life of a clique of Calle Dieciocho in El Salvador, was cut short when the 
members of the gang shot and killed him.127 According to the Salvadoran police, Poveda 
was shot because the clique suspected he was passing information to them.128  
The lack of research on gangs has led to variation in statistics and analysis to the 
extent of the gang problem. Notwithstanding the difficulty in gathering quantitative data, 
several estimates have placed the numbers at 50,000 in 2003, 24,000 in 2008 and 12,000 
in 2012 (see Figure 10).129 Some estimates placed the numbers of gang members as low 
as 4,728.130 The fact is that there is no accurate data on how many gang members are in 
Honduras, and most of the figures are to be questioned. In retrospect, some of the 
headlines noting that as many as 70,000 sympathizers could also decide to join just 
helped blur the extent of the problem.131  
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Figure 10.  Estimates of Mareros in the Northern Triangle, 2012  
(from UNODC Transnational Organized Crime in Central  
America and the Caribbean, September 2012). 
Part of the problem is that the police, military, NGOs, and the Honduran society 
have yet to get a full appreciation of the complexity of gang membership and formation. 
Citizens see a one-sided view of mareros and the other is told to them by corrupt and 
untrained police. The Church and other agencies working in Honduras further cloud the 
understanding by linking gangs to societal problems that on the one hand sometimes do 
explain some cases of youth joining gangs, but that in the majority of cases do not. 
Further complicating matters are international observers’ outrageous claims that linked 
gangs to the new type of insurgency that may challenge the state authorities through 
“coups d’ street.”132  
Religion plays a major role in Honduras. In addition to the increase in violence in 
the last 15 years, there has also been an increase in evangelical Christian movements, 
especially the prominence of evangelicalism.133 The mara culture invokes both devilish 
type admiration combined with religious symbolism. Tattoos of maras will often display 
both the allegiance to the gang and to God. For the mareros that want to leave the gang 
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lifestyle, becoming a devout Christian is one of the few alternatives recognized by the 
gang. The religious congregations and the population that are considered cristianos are 
not victimized relative to the remainder of the population that is not devout Christians. In 
this vein, religion is a major factor bridging maras and society. In Honduras, most people 
believe that ultimately it is God who decides their fate. There are many dangerous and 
impoverished aldeas and colonias, too many for a country that believes in the power of 
destiny. Yet, when there are no institutions of social control, belief in a higher power 
provides a sense of security against the chaos rampant in Honduras.    
One of the major actors that assisted with brokering the gang truce in El Salvador 
was the Church. The Honduran religious leaders have also attempted to become 
mediators in similar agreements between the state, mareros and society. Despite the lack 
of success with reducing violence, religious groups are likely to continue to play a major 
role as long as religion maintains the same significance in maras. The complexity of 
between violence, gang life, and religion were vividly presented in the film La Vida 
Loca.     
The nexus of urbanization, an unusually large percentage of youth population, the 
decay of the typical nuclear family, and the economy have been largely utilized as causal 
reasons why young men and some women join maras. Urban density has been promoted 
as a major reason narco-trafficking and crime has grown because fewer resources and 
more people in a smaller space supposedly create conflict.134 However, these reasons 
must be extensively assessed in the Honduras case and must not be applied as freely as it 
has been thus far. The violence in Honduras goes beyond the simple explanations of 
urbanization and poor youth lacking any options but to join gangs. 
Also important, yet not discussed in Honduras, are studies that contradict reasons 
that drive young people to gangs. A 2001 survey of 1,000 gang members by the Instituto 
Universitario de Opinion Publica (IUDOP) found that 40 percent claimed to have joined 
the gang to “hang out,” 21 percent because of friends already in the gang, and 21 percent 
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to get away from family problems.135 Employment appeared as a positive correlation,  
17 percent responded that they were employed, in contrast to 66 percent that responded 
unemployed.136 
There are also problems with the job theory relating to gangs and crime. The 
theory states that “The job, with its regular hours, its restrictions, and its compensation, 
settles the adolescent down and satisfies his previously unsatisfied wants.”137 The 
assumption that those with jobs are less likely to commit crime than those without jobs is 
incorrect. According to Gottfredson and Hirschi, people attached to jobs “are more rather 
than less likely to be delinquent.”138 When they tested their theory in control groups, 
assigning jobs to some and withholding jobs from others, Hirchi and Gottfredson found 
“differences in rates of crime are small, non-existent, or even in the wrong direction.”139  
Furthermore, mareros who want to hang out or be with their maras do not 
necessarily want to work. That is the total opposite reason for joining gangs. In this 
context, it can expected that gang members’ rates of unemployment will be higher 
because most do not want to have a traditional job that pays them a small wage working 
in the fields or maquilas.  
In Honduras, the vast majority of mareros are male between the ages of 12 and 
30.140  The median age for males in Honduras is 21.6141 years old and 54 percent of the 
population is between 10 and 29 years of age.142 With an estimated 8.5 million 
population, conservative estimates would place nearly a quarter of the population in  
the “at risk” category. According to human rights activists, young men between 12 and 
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24 accounted for nearly 73 percent of the violent deaths recorded in Honduras in 2001.143 
Further, according to the UNODC, in Honduras 1 in 360 males aged 15–29 falls victim to 
intentional homicide every year, compared to 1 in 280 males in the 30–44 age group  
(see Figure 11).144 
 
Figure 11.  Male Homicide Rate, by Age Group, Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Jamaica, 2012 (UNODC, 2014). 
In addition, today’s data of victims of intentional homicides, age group rates of 
arrested has also has been proven invariant across societies and culture.145 Studies have 
shown no variance in the age distribution of crime from England and Wales 1842–44, 
England in 1908 and the United States in 1979. Recent data has prompted the conclusion 
that despite the total number of arrests increasing, age followed in the same pattern, with 
15- to 17-year-olds constituting the highest arrest rates per population of any age 
group.146 
When thinking about the huge numbers, the absurdity of the claims becomes 
evident. Nevertheless, that did not stop presidential administrations from declaring war 
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on maras and in the process to a degree also declaring war against poor young males. In 
2010, 36.6 percent of Honduras lived in poverty, of those 20.1 percent lived in extreme 
poverty (see Table 3)147  
 
 Poverty % Extreme Poverty % Unemployment % 
Honduras (2010) 36.6 20.1 6.0 (2013) 
Guatemala (2006) 25.5 11.3  
El Salvador (2012) 16.7 3.9 6.2  
Table 3.   Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador: Poverty, Extreme 
Poverty and Unemployment, Latest Year (from ECLAC, 2014).148 
The government under the administration of Ricardo Maduro sided with the 
rhetoric that maras were actors responsible for the insecurity in the country. Mano dura 
policies followed, and initial declines in homicides in 2004 generated short-term 
legitimacy to what we know today were bad policies. The nexus between crime and 
gangs was highly exaggerated, partly because there were multiple criminal actors 
participating in the violence landscape. As it turns out, mara members were the easiest to 
target because of their territorial nature and over the top tattoos and distinctive clothing. 
Unsurprisingly, many mareros began to hide in the countryside and spreading gang 
doctrine in different areas of Honduras.  
Mandatory sentencing and pressure on prosecutors and judges to get mareros off 
the street resulted in increased prison population. The prosecution of mareros was highly 
questionable, often the evidence was recycle from one case to another utilizing one 
witness testimony for several cases. Authorities had to come with creative ways, after all 
in Honduras witness do not come forward. As a result, the prison population nearly 
doubled from 6,200 in 1994 to 11,200 in 2004.149  
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None of the Northern-tier countries had success with their versions of heavy-
handed policies. With international and domestic pressure, all three countries have been 
forced to find alternate ways to deal with youth violence.150 Thus far, Honduras struggles 
to implement strategies that are not some sort of an authoritarian type response.  
B. A WEAK AND FRAGILE STATE 
Max Weber defined the state as “a human community that claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”151 Using Weber’s 
definition as a baseline, Lothar Brock highlights the government, the economy and 
nationhood as major areas of deficiencies characteristic of fragile states.152 Depending on 
the weakness in each of these areas—determines how much violence, poverty, and 
national identity exists. In 2009, the Fund for Peace Failed States Index listed 131 of  
177 states in critical, in danger, or near state failure.153 The Failed State Index ranks 
Honduras 75th out of 178 countries.154 Similarly, the Brooking Institute utilizing  
20 indicators of state weakness placed Honduras 69th out of 141.155 While Honduras is 
not in the levels of Rwanda, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or even 
Haiti, the Honduran security crisis is alarming. These rankings also show that while 
public security is a major concern, the state is not at risk of collapsing or becoming a 
failed state. With all the problems and shortcomings in Honduras, the situation there is 
better than in almost half of the world’s states.  
Strong societies are extremely important to make a strong state stronger and a 
weak state stable. A strong state requires a strong society for longevity, whereas a weak 
state can survive as long as it has a strong society, however a weak state and a weak 
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society pose the greatest problem internally and regionally. In Central America, Costa 
Rica is an example of a strong state with a strong society, in Honduras on the other hand, 
both the state and society are weak. The end result is one state that has the highest 
homicide rate in the world, whereas Costa Rica is a model for democracy and security in 
an area dominated by weak states and weak societies.  
For nearly 15 years, from the mid-1990s through 2010, the United States’ national 
security narrative emphasized the dangers posed by fragile states.156 The Bush 
administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy argued that threat to the United States 
had shifted from conquering states to failing ones.157 The conceptual framework of the 
consequences of fragile states has relied on the belief that these territories are fertile 
grounds for terrorism, violence, regional instability, disease outbreak, and environmental 
hazards.158 The first assessment on the fragility of the state is the internal threat posed by 
the state toward the population and the inability of the state to protect them. 
The “spillover” effect is one of the main concerns for regional security that 
directly affects Honduras. International economic and political factors also shaped how 
the developed nations view state fragility. The failure of neoliberal reforms and weak 
structural and institutional capacity has adversely impacted the Third World. Public 
security is a major issue affecting the weak states in these regions. The current landscape 
of increasing social and criminal violence cannot be divorced from the political history 
and modes of transition to democracy. Africa and Latin America rank first and second, 
respectively, in the number of homicides per capita. Figures from the United Nations’ 
2011 global study of homicides reported the homicide rate in Africa and the Americas  
(at 17 and 16 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively) is more than double the global 
average (6.9 per 100,000). The homicide figures for Asia, Europe, and Oceania (between 
3 and 4 per 100,000) are roughly half.159 
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The solution for a weak and fragile state lies in the ability of the political leaders 
of the fragile state to implement reforms and have the resources available to sustain them. 
Both of these reforms have been absent in Honduras. In countries like Honduras, Kenneth 
J. Menkhaus accurately describes the fragile state paradigm as a “wicked” problem. State 
fragility is a wicked problem, he argues, because it is not solvable due to the leaders’ 
unwillingness, capability, and the state’s capacity.160   
1. Political Corruption in Honduras  
Political corruption is widespread in Honduras. The two center-right parties have 
ruled the country for most of the 20th century and since the end of military rule. In 
addition to their similar ideology, “the objective of political competition between the two 
parties has not been a competition for policies or programs, but rather a competition for 
personal gain in which the public sector is turned into private benefit.”161 
The corruption is so evident and widespread that all the political leaders, 
institutions and citizens call for reforms. Hondurans have “little or no confidence in 
almost every governmental and political institution in the country, with political parties 
among the least trusted.”162 The call for action is puzzling. If the leaders and institutions 
are calling for action, then it begs the question: who is corrupt? The issue of corruption 
was a major issue during the last campaign. For the first time in nearly a century, the 
hegemony of the two major political parties was challenged. Six months prior to the 
presidential election, polls had Xiomara Castro, of Libertad y Refundación (LIBRE) in 
the lead with 28 percent. She was followed by television personality Salvador Nasralla, 
founder and candidate of the Partido Anti-Corrupcion (PAC) with 21 percent, Juan 
Orlando Hernández of the PN 18 percent, and Mauricio Villeda of the PL fourth with  
14 percent.  
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Juan Orlando Hernandez eventually won the election with 36.89 percent, followed 
by Xiomara Castro with 28.78 percent, Mauricio Villeda with 20.30 percent, and in 
fourth place Salvador Nasralla with 13.43 percent of the popular vote.163 Despite not 
winning the elections, Castro, the wife of ousted President Manuel Zelaya, and Nasralla, 
a political outsider, proved that the two-party system in Honduras is on shaky ground at 
best and with the possibility of more changes at the horizon given the rampant corruption 
and security failure largely attributed to the two dominant parties.  
Corruption is not only reserved for politicians. The drug trade has increased the 
scale and extent of corruption and criminal activity throughout all economic classes. 
Participating in the drug trade is not only appealing to nearly 80 percent of the population 
that compete for 40 percent of the distribution of income, but also for the richest  
20 percent that account for 60.2 percent of the country’s income distribution.164 Over the 
years, Honduran elites have sought to gain from the drug trade through their influences 
and positions in society.165 Although not nearly at the level of other Central American 
countries, money laundering has grown exponentially. In 2010, The Honduran National 
Police (PNC) in a joint operation with the DEA seized $7,547,000 at the International 
airport in San Pedro Sula.166 Furthermore, Los Cachiros and Handal Perez DTOs have 
laundered millions of dollars in mainstream business, banking, and real estate (see 
Appendices A and B). Similar to other TCOs, Honduran traffickers are having a hard 
time figuring out what to do with so much money.  
According to Bunck and Fowler, the corruption in the Honduran criminal justice 
system is “truly spectacular in its depth and extent.”167 In 2000, the DOS observed that 
“the judicial system is under severe strain due to corrupt, inefficient and overworked 
judges and lack training and equipment.”168 There are two types of corruption—grand 
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corruption done by senior officials, and petty corruption, done by lower-level 
functionaries.169 Political corruption is defined as “the abuse of public office for private 
gain.”170 Common abuses of elected or appointed officials include embezzlement, 
bribery, peddling and nepotism. Grand corruption involves senior political and 
government officials usually in the form of large sums of money, whereas petty 
corruption involves lesser amounts of money and lower-level state officials.171  
Transparency International, an anticorruption NGO, created in 1995 a corruption 
perception that merges different surveys conducted by independent institutions. In 2008, 
out of the 180 countries studied, Transparency International ranked Honduras 126 and 
Nicaragua 134, the bottom two in Central America. Moreover, on their scale most corrupt 
and least corrupt (1.0 and 10, respectively), Honduras’s score was 2.6. In contrast, Costa 
Rica fared the best in the region, with a ranking of 47 and a score of 5.1.172 Overall, 
Honduras ranks in the bottom third of all countries studied, trailing only Paraguay, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Haiti as countries in the Americas suffering from rampant 
corruption.173 
In the World Bank Control of Corruption Indicator, Honduras, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua placed near the bottom 25th percentile of the 208 nations covered. 
Latinobarómetro corruption surveys, provide public opinion surveys of citizens’ opinions 
and experiences with corruption. In 2008, Latinobarómetro asked, “Imagine there are  
100 public employees in the country and you have to say how many you believe are 
corrupt. How many would you say are corrupt?” Honduran citizens’ responses were the 
most negative, with the opinion that 80.6 out of 100 were corrupt. There are variations in 
the studies of corruption, for instance LAPOP Americas Barometer, found Panama 
number one (least) and Costa Rica fifth in Central America in term of percentage of 
                                                 
169 J. Mark Ruhl, “Political Corruption in Central America Assessment and Explanation” Latin 
American Politics and Society 53, No.1 (2011): 33. 
170 World Bank, “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank” (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 1997), 8. 
171 Ruhl, “Political Corruption,” 35. 
172 Ibid., 36. 
173 Ibid. 
 59
respondents victimized by corruption and percentage of citizens that were asked for a 
bribe by a public employee.174 Combined, however, the consensus is that Costa Rica is 
the least corrupt and Honduras and Nicaragua the most corrupt. Both countries suffer 
from rampant high-level corruption and middle-range petty corruption.175 Ruhl argues 
that progress can be made by targeting petty corruption first because it touches more 
people and through the reduction of red tape in bureaucratic low-level processes are a 
relative easier fix vis-a-vis grand corruption which is more complex.176  
An important aspect of corruption also involves weak judiciary, where the cost of 
corruption is small; the rates for grand corruption are higher. Not surprisingly, 
Honduras’s weak judiciary is a major contributor to both grand and petty corruption. 
When asked in regard to the Honduran judicial corruption, a foreign official expert in 
antidrug matters stated, “I can’t imagine it’s any worse anywhere else in Central 
America. Here it’s blatant bribery. Put the money on the table and adios. It extends all the 
way through the judicial system and right up to the Supreme Court.”177  
To address the problem, Honduras created the National Anticorruption Council 
and Central American countries signed the Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption (IACAC), the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), and 
the Guatemala Declaration for a Region Free of Corruption, and also have passed 
anticorruption laws advocated by foreign aid donors. The preliminary assessment is that 
these councils, although well intentioned, do not fix the widespread corruption because 
little has been done to strengthen the judicial systems in charge of prosecution. Ruhl 
concludes that Latin America’s most corrupt nations will take time to transform due to 
the weak law enforcement institutions and the limited financial resources.178 
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2. Institutional Capacity 
“Institutions, institutions, institutions,” Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson 
argue, is the most common reason why nations fail today.179 States that have political 
institutions that support extractive economic institutions cement the power of those that 
benefit from the extraction and take away the incentives for people to innovate, and 
invest, retarding the growth of institutions capable to withstand corruption. In Honduras, 
the nation’s politics have been dominated by elites and the military. In 2009, these two 
groups allied to remove President Jose Manual Zelaya when he attempted to convene a 
referendum to authorize a constituent assembly that would enable him to run for a second 
term. The coup was in part generated from within his party, and after his removal 
President of the Congress Roberto Micheleti, and of the same party, took over as 
President.  
Neoliberal economic reforms calls for the privatization of previously state owned 
industries as well as reducing the size of the state in part by reducing the budget. Despite 
not getting affected by overall national defense budget cuts, Honduras armed forces were 
severely affected in their off-budget ventures that made up a large percentage of their 
funds. The neoliberal reforms and democratization forced them to sell their services to 
third parties. Prior to liberalization and democratization, the military were involved in 
off-budget entrepreneur ventures. Honduras military has relied heavily on illegal 
activities to augment the funds it received from the national budget. Through 
democratization demands for transparency, such activities became constrained. The 
Roberto Reina government cut 10 percent of the budget at the same time the United 
States dropped the military assistance to $500,000.180 Additionally, the military lost 
control of the profitable state telecommunications agency (HONDUTEL), the 
Department of Immigration and the Merchant Marine. The military had used 
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HONDUTEL and the other institutions to make up for budget cuts and as sources of 
illicit income. 
The national police are rightly accused of ineptitude, corruption and taking part in 
crimes against the population. The fact that the police are so weak in Honduras is a direct 
result of the elites and the armed forces. The Honduran police did not exist as an 
institution prior to 1998. It was not until 1998 that the Honduran Congress created the 
PNC, under the command of the Ministry of Security responsible for law enforcement. 
The military lost further ground in 1999 when a constitutional reform abolished the 
position of chief of the armed forces and subordinated the military to a civilian defense 
minister.181  
The new changes in responsibility for the police and military came at a time when 
the country began to face critical economic and security challenges. Hurricane Mitch 
devastated the country in 1998, affecting two-thirds of the population displacing 
hundreds of thousands and destroying the banana, shrimp, coffee, pineapple and African 
palm plantations. The situation motivated a flight of Hondurans migrating to the United 
States and created a large population in dire needs.  
By the year 2000, the homicide rate in Honduras climbed to 50 homicides per 
100,000 people and, to further complicate matters, it was estimated that the membership 
in the maras reached 36,000, and increased to an estimated 50,000 by 2003.182  
The PNC, which has the least amount of officers per citizen in Central America, 
was overwhelmed. Untrained, underfunded and with the military and the elites trying to 
control the institution, unsurprisingly the institution never build a solid foundation. 
Today, these problems are unresolved, with the latest recommendations to purge the 
police and begin anew. As discussed in the previous chapter, the military once again has 
been asked to intervene in the security of the country.  
In 2011, the Internal Affairs Directorate had 145 ongoing investigations of police 
officers regarding criminal complaints, abuse of authority, robbery, police brutality, and 
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homicide. The directorate began legal proceedings in 43 of the cases, but was dismantled 
before the investigations were completed.183  
Until recently, the police was also in charge for the administration of Honduras 
prisons. Prisons are now under the authority of the National Directorate of Special 
Preventive Services (Direccion Nacional de Servicios Preventivos—DNSEP) also under 
the Minister of Security. The 24 prisons house 12,500 inmates, exceeding the 8,280 
capacity.184  
None of the institutions, which have also included assistance from the military, 
have been able to curtail the influence generated by criminals inside prisons. Authorities 
have estimated that nearly 90 percent of extortions, kidnappings, and large percentage of 
contract killings are ordered from inside prison walls. Many of the orders were done with 
cell phones. Authorities cited an example where a marero allegedly order 100 killings 
from his cell-phone inside prison walls.185  
The prisons are grounds for contention for the authorities and inmates. The 
conditions are deplorable, which is to be expected with the state spending less than a 
dollar a day on each inmate. Much of the daily food consists of rice, beans and tortillas. 
Additionally, in the last ten years there have been three prison fires, killing over 600 
prisoners. The last one occurred in February 2012, when a fire killed over 350 inmates, 
and half of those killed reportedly had not been convicted.186  
C. CONCLUSION 
In sum, this chapter has shown that the major factors affecting violence in 
Honduras are related to transnational organized crime and the inability of the Honduran 
state to provide security to the populace. The shifts in the global illicit market, cocaine in 
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particular, worsen the criminal environment in Honduras. Had cocaine not entered the 
picture, Honduras will still be a violent country, however the levels and manner in which 
criminal gangs have proliferated most of the institutions would differ. Drug trafficking 
has been the gas that increased the fire and today it keeps it going.  
Transnational organized crime has changed the way business is conducted in 
Honduras. Corruption has always been part of Hondurans life, but today the ability to 
bribe authorities is not exclusive to the country’s elite. Even for poor Hondurans, 
corruption does not pay off in terms of personal benefit or security like it did prior to the 
crime wave that began in the 90s. TCOs have the ability to both fight state authorities and 
bribe them.  
The weakness of the Honduran state, particularly its institutions in charge of law 
and order, are the faulty foundation that everything that is has been built on has failed. 
The results are some of the most ineffective, corrupt, and incapable institutions in the 
Americas. Moreover, the long-term effects have created a weak society that is unable to 
balance the weakness of the state and stand up against the criminal elements that have 
spread throughout the country.  
Other factors such as maras, economic, youth population, lack of education, 
teenage pregnancy, culture, and geography have been studied and dismissed as critical to 
the explanation of crime. These factors are detrimental to the development of the state, 
and they are in part a result of defects in long-term development policies. They are not 
however, the reason Honduras violence levels are the highest in the world.  
The state’s inability to provide security to the general population and the dirty 
money has further complicated matters. With the dilemma of the militarization of 
security and the option of status quo with corrupt police and criminal justice system, what 
are the alternatives to PMOP and TIGRES? Honduran citizens prefer the militarization of 
Honduras. This is not only true for Honduras but for most of Latin America as well. 
Several Western democracies have experience the rise of crime rates and with it a 
growing sense of insecurity that has garnered populist support for increase punishment 
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even if it means giving up the protection of civil liberties in the effort to reduce 
criminality.187   
That is what they know to work. When analyzing the events that take place and 
the power of criminals in Honduras it becomes evident that the options are limited. These 
forces will be better than the police, but the short term must also incorporate 
transformation of civilian institutions.   
Mas trabajo y menos violencia. More jobs and less violence is a common demand 
in Honduras. Families have barricaded themselves in their homes through a hardening of 
security. The sector of the population that can afford it hires private security that as a 
whole outnumbers the country’s security forces. Working class residents also combine 
resources to pay for security. At the very minimum families put up barbed wire on top of 
the tall cinder block fence throughout their homes. Large businesses have armed men 
with shotguns throughout their premises. Even small businesses have adapted the practice 
of hiring their own armed security. Most of the security guards are not trained; it becomes 
evident that it is a deterrent for criminals to move on to easier targets and to give the 
customer a false sense of security. 
Most Hondurans leave for their homes everyday with the realization that they are 
likely to get robbed, witness a crime, pursue, or in the most severe cases have a relative 
or an acquaintance that ends up dead. Worse than the statistics, is the constant fear that 
citizens live with each and every day. The most simple and mundane of activities need 
coordination and planning. Things like driving at night have become so dangerous that 
only the brave souls do it. In addition to the dangers posed by criminals, is also the poor 
infrastructure and failure to follow laws by the majority of the population. In 2012, 1,243 
deaths happened as a result of traffic accidents.188  The culture of not adhering to the rule 
of law has worsened over the years, further exacerbated with the lack of trust in the 
political institutions.   
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Prosperity also has its costs. Many small businesses are extorted, and many chose 
to pay rather than face the alternative. There is no police that can save a citizen when 
criminal groups have set their target set on them. Citizens young and old, poor and rich 
are imprisoned in their homes, extorted in their business, endangered in the streets. The 
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IV. IS HONDURAS SIMPLY EXPERIENCING A CRIME WAVE? 
One of the major limitations of studying violence in Honduras is that there is no 
longitudinal study to provide context. This is problem not only for Honduras but for most 
of Latin America as well. In Central America, the comparative studies have focused on 
comparing each country’s development and the history of internal conflicts. The end 
result, while instructive, leaves more questions. For instance, El Salvador has some of 
most trusted and more capable institutions relative to Guatemala,189  yet it has had more 
violence and crime. Honduras, which did not have repressive civilian or military regimes 
relative to Nicaragua, has had more violence over the last 20 years. 
Given the lack of cross-national consistency of institutions and democracy in the 
region, an important question to ask is whether this is just a new crime wave in Honduras. 
That as society, criminal actors and the state learn to cohabitate, the crime levels will 
decrease. Perhaps the new crime wave is Honduras’s civil war, and therefore must be 
judged accordingly. The difficulty lies in the determining the staying power of the 
criminal element and the influx of drug trafficking and growth of dirty money inside the 
country.  
An instructive comparison would be with a nation for which longitudinal research 
has been undertaken. David LaFree’s longitudinal research of U.S. violent crime rates 
contends that the “understanding of crime trends is hampered by a lack of longitudinal 
analysis and by ahistorical approaches.”190 The Honduran understanding of crime is 
hampered by the lack of reliable data; it has not been until recently that information has 
been systematically collected. In the United States, there are two main data sources: the 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), collected annually since 1930 by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), collected every six 
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months since 1973 by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.191 The UNODC published crime 
rates for Honduras come from the criminal justice system two main data points: the 
Observatorio Centroamericano sobre Violencia (The Central American Observatory on 
Violence, OCAVI) and the National Statistical Office (NSO). OCAVI source of data 
comes from the police.192 As highlighted earlier, the Honduran police force did not exist 
as an autonomous institution until 1999, is rampant with corruption, lack of capacity, 
training, and is hamstrung by lack of resources; therefore, because few crimes are 
reported to the police and with limited data gathering for most other crimes besides 
homicides, the data are not reliable.  
The comparison with the United States at first may be thought of as a stretch 
given the differences in the economy, power, among others. However, a key development 
in crime in Central America has been the influence of the United States. Already well-
documented, is the United States’ support of military regimes and authoritarian 
dictatorships against the perceived communist threat. Second, the end of the Cold War 
and the United States excess of power shifted policy to spreading democracy in weak 
states. Third, neoliberal economic policies also brought ideas and strategies to fight 
violence. The region has seen a proliferation of Western ideas—aided with the influence 
of foreign aid, of how to reduce crime. I argue that the problem is that when this occurred 
in the late 1990s, the United States’ understanding of crime was flawed, and those ideas 
made their way to Central America. While repressive policies were the result of the 
preference of authoritarian policies in the Northern Triangle, this approach was in part 
because these countries sought to simulate the practices in the United States in the hope 
that their crime rates would decline as well.  
A major blunder in the understanding in criminality in the United States happened 
when researchers propagated the concept of the generation of “superpredators.”193 
According to predictions, with a growing youth population in the United States these 
young killers “would soon unleash the full force of their destructive capacities on an 
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already crime-weary nation.”194 The results were passage of laws with mandatory 
sentences, harsher penalties for repeated offenders and removing discretionary power of 
judges during sentencing. In 1996, U.S. imprisonment rates increased to 427 per 100,000 
residents, four times the rates of 1974.195 Today, the United States has 25percent of the 
world’s prison population at 2.4 million, nearly 750 inmates per 100,000 residents.196 
The study of crime waves in Honduras might be advanced by examining research 
in other fields such as economics and migration. The current crime wave in Honduras 
also correlates with wave of out-migration, deportations rates, maras and the rise of drug 
trafficking. The relationship highlights the changes in the environmental conditions to 
commit crime. A person’s “decisions to commit crime are in part a product of how many 
other people are engaging in crime at a given point in time.”197  
Honduras mano dura policies were attempting to replicate the results in the United 
States. One of the most cited successes was that of New York City in the 90s. New York 
City had 2,262 homicides in 1990; six years later the number declined 57 percent to  
985 homicides.198 Several other U.S. cities also saw their numbers decline, and the 
success was attributed to changes in policing strategies. New York City strategy focused 
on “quality of life” offenses such as drinking in public, and urinating in the streets. The 
strategy was targeted against “young toughs” perceived as threatening to their 
neighborhoods.199 
On its own, replicating the success of New York City appeared as a good 
template. However, after further analysis, the connection between the decline of homicide 
rates and police strategy might have been purely coincidental and not cause and effect. 
The questioning comes after results in other cities that did not change policing styles had 
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declining rates as well. Therefore, the declines in crime rates are not necessarily 
correlated to policy and police action. The direct correlation is directly attributed to the 
criminalization of lesser infractions that in part has led to the highest incarceration rates.  
The incarceration rates provided a correlation to preventing crime that might not 
have been there. In the eyes of law enforcement and policy-makers, more people in jails 
meant less crime in the street. It seemed like a positive correlation. That conclusion, 
however, does not take into account factors that are independent to crime policy. LaFree 
calls these factors “exogenous effects.”200 
Among the exogenous effects most often linked to violent crime by researchers 
are economic stress, political legitimacy, and family disorganization.201 All these three 
factors are present in the Honduras violent crime landscape. The economic stress is a 
popular explanation, given the dismal wages and employment opportunities in Honduras. 
Because of the lack of longitudinal data, is difficult to assess how strong the correlation 
between economic stress and crime actually is. What is known is that the out-migration is 
directly linked to the stress brought on by lack of opportunities in the home country. 
Since that is a recent phenomenon, making any correlation between cause and effect is 
precarious. While economic stress is not necessarily invariant given the changes in the 
global economy and the ongoing transformation in Honduras from subsistence agriculture 
to manufacturing and services, the study must contrast the economic stress of today 
versus previous decades. That, however, is difficult to correlate and measure.   
The weak institutions in Honduras provide a positive correlation to violent crime. 
Weber defines legitimate power as “the probability that certain commands from a given 
source will be obeyed by a given group of persons.”202 The commands from the state 
institutions are not followed by the population and there is no “voluntary submission.” 
That means that most laws that the state seeks the population to comply with must be 
directly enforced. The social control mechanisms at the local level are not strong enough. 
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The political legitimacy is further complicated with low levels of trust and political 
instability in the executive, judicial and congress.  
While institutions are part of the solution and responsible for setting the 
conditions for public security, they are not the major reason for the boom in the crime 
wave. There are other exogenous factors that have affected the criminal environment. 
Drug trafficking, especially cocaine, has provided the resources for criminals to expand 
their activities throughout Honduras. Complicating the correlation between drugs and 
crime is that, as cocaine trafficking from Honduras started to increase, cocaine 
consumption in the United States has decreased by 40 percent between 1999 and 2009. 
The shift demonstrates that addiction is not unique to Americans and that other nations 
are becoming larger consumers. While 63 percent of the world’s cocaine supply is 
consumed in the Americas, Europeans consumed 29 percent. Consumption of cocaine has 
doubled in 27 EU countries from 1998 through 2006.203 With Europeans paying more 
than twice as much as American consumers, it appears that even as the United States 
consumption declines the drug trade will remain as part of the Honduran criminal 
landscape.   
Drugs are not the only commodity affecting the boom in crime the proliferation of 
firearms has armed most of the criminals in the country. An estimated 82 percent of all 
homicides are committed with a firearm, mostly by criminal organizations. The long guns 
remained in circulation since the end of the Cold War. There is a preference for handguns 
to commit crime because they are easier to conceal. Between 2008 and 2011, 9mm pistols 
accounted for 63 percent of the weapons seized. While some are smuggled into the 
country, most of the handguns in Honduras are bought and then exported legally from the 
United States. Another major factor is leakage of firearms from the civilian, police, and 
military sector to the criminal sector.204  
Honduras has become a major trafficker in guns, particularly to Colombia and 
Mexico. The military and police stockpiles in the Northern triangle have been identified 
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as the largest sources of illegal firearms in the region. UNODC estimates that 36 percent 
of the illegal trafficked firearms in Colombia come from Central America. Additionally, 
heavy guns recovered in Mexico have been traced to United States sales to the Honduran 
military.205 Nicaragua and Panama are major players as well. Nicaragua has the largest 
surplus of firearms in the region and is the destination of illicit weapons shipments. 
Panama, with its duty free arms purchases, is a convenient shopping center for 9mm 
pistols that are currently in high demand.206  
In sum, the study of Honduras violence is complex. The crime boom, which 
began in the late 1990s, points to transnational criminals and drug trafficking as the major 
factors affecting the criminal environment. Predicting whether the current trend will 
remain or when it will begin to decline is difficult. That will depend on the staying power 
of drug trafficking and Honduras becoming a producer and processor in addition to 
transportistas. The current crime rates are sustainable, while the public security 
environment is dangerous to say the least; nonetheless, Hondurans have adopted coping 
mechanisms.  
The current positive feedback loops—the sources of growth, explosion, and 
collapse in systems—will continue until it they destroy themselves, or reach the 
maximum the Honduran society can tolerate. Sooner or later, regardless of how high the 
crime rate gets, it must come down either by itself or when self-correcting measures kick 
in, as in negative feedback loops.207   
Donella Meadows calls for caution when there is great demand to intervene in a 
system.208 Misunderstanding the problem may lead to not targeting the right sources of 
growth and in turn put in place the wrong negative feedback loops. Doing so will not 
only make the problem worse, but it will make every decision thereafter much more 
difficult. There are no free trials and every decision has severe consequences.  
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That is why the lack of longitudinal and ethnography research into the crime 
boom in the Honduras violent landscape needs to be addressed before reaching a 
conclusion. The study of the crime waves in the United States and the flawed conclusions 
reached in the 1990s provide a cautionary tale of the problems with predicting crime and 




























Honduras is a country with a myriad of problems. The country is one of the 
poorest in the Western Hemisphere, the corruption levels among the highest, the impunity 
rate is over 95 percent, the infrastructure of the country is among the worst, the education 
system is outdated and underfunded, the country has an internal deficit and external 
deficit, usually pays off interest by delaying payments to government employees. The 
police have resisted reforms, and efforts to purge the police of corruption through vetting 
have been slowed. The prison situation is critical and the country is on the losing end of 
the balloon and cockroach effect. 
The long-term effects of development have been covered extensively in Latin 
American literature, but they are only part of the public security failure in Honduras. 
Economic development is important to fund education, healthcare and provide jobs to an 
increasing young population. The economic opportunity that explains the security 
breakdown in Honduras today is the dramatic increase in the illicit economy and the 
growth of transnational criminal organizations that have successfully established 
operations in Honduras. One thing is for the state not to have the resources to advance 
development, another thing is to have a large powerful criminal element willing and able 
to fight and bribe the Honduran state and its population. After all, Honduras has one of 
the weakest state apparatuses and weakest society. The combinations of these two factors 
have turned Honduras into a criminal’s paradise. Honduras is the newest version of 
Colombia of the 1990s and of Northern Mexico in the early part of this century.  
The concept for this thesis began with analyzing public security at a country at the 
crossroads. As the research for this project developed, it became evident that such 
descriptions of Honduras at the crossroads and at critical juncture have been used 
regularly to describe the situation. Yet, it became evident to understand the correlation of 
development of the state institutions and political parties with the new criminal actors. To 
bring the discussion of public security in Honduras up to date also requires going beyond 
the headlines of chronic poverty and inequality, latest coup, and maras. While there is not 
one single factor responsible for the increase violence in Honduras, the current situation 
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is defined by criminal organizations foreign and native to Honduras as well as the 
exponential rise in the illicit economy. 
At the beginning of the century with the influence of Samuel Zemurray, the 
United Fruit Company (UFCO) became the most powerful actor in Honduras politics and 
the economy. Moreover, in the 1950s, several coups by the military and within the 
military shifted power between the two political parties and the military. Mario Posas’ 
1980s article, “Honduras at the Crossroads,” brought attention to the Honduran struggle 
for political inclusion and the influence of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, and violence in Guatemala and the political influence of the United States.  
The study of homicides and violence in Honduras is a conundrum. On the one 
hand, most explanations for causations or factors that affect the criminal environment are 
present. Poverty levels and underdevelopment have left very few resources for the state. 
Migration to the United States, shift in the traditional roles with more women in the 
workplace, and the increase in the urban population also have coincided with high levels 
of crime. Complicating things further, deportations from the United States also brought 
the gang culture of territoriality, extortions, and the threat of death altered the power 
dynamics. At the very same time, the police was reborn as an independent institution, 
outside the structure of the military. Natural disasters, with Hurricane Mitch, also 
contributed to the severe economic situation by destroying many of the crops and exports 
in the country.  
In 2007, a major shift in drug trafficking made the Honduran territory a spoke and 
mini hub of cocaine distribution, with increasing amounts staying in country. In 2009, the 
coup that removed Manuel Zelaya, further demonstrated that political divide that exists in 
the country. Moreover, The Good Coup, as titled by Marco Caceres Di Orio,209 further 
deteriorated the economic and security situation in the country. It was during Zelaya’s 
term that the Honduran Caribbean coast became a major transshipment location for  
drug traffickers. Complicating things further, according to a former security minister,  
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30 percent of police officers were involved in organized crime and 50 percent of the 
investigative unit was in the payroll of one of the two Mexican cartels.210 
The only explanation that Honduras does not have is that it did not have a civil 
war or a revolutionary movement like its neighbors El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Nicaragua. Because everything appears to fit as an explanation to the breakdown in 
public security, this has blurred what is the real problem. Therefore, to solve the crime 
problem the country’s leaders have utilized the explanations and acted to curb the 
increase in violence. Despite the good intentions of the Honduran government, the 
reforms and policies to curb violence did not account for the complexity of the Honduras 
problem. That is, gangs, drug trafficking, sicarios, corruption, do not exist in a vacuum. 
The second-, third-, and fourth-order effects, and so on, were not properly accounted for. 
Every action that the government has taken not only has not worked, but has also 
worsened the conditions making subsequent decisions more difficult.  
Scarce resources and the increasing violence in part fueled by drug trafficking has 
impacted the state’s decision to once again use the armed forces for public security. 
Hondurans institutions are rampant with high level and low level corruption, and the 
options are limited. Not since Juan Matta Ballesteros have there been powerful actors 
able to challenge the state. Today, there are hundreds if not thousands of criminals 
claiming their space in Honduras.  
The Quagmire of Militarization of Pubic Security 
The current action to curb violence through militarization of public security has 
its limits. Without a clear long-term strategy to develop a strong police force, 
strengthening the criminal justice system and create checks and balances against 
corruption the country is unlikely to see better results down the road. There are no quick 
fixes when it comes to crime. A clear strategy with the use of the military during the 
current severe security crisis, coupled with a plan to address the shortcomings of 
institutions must be done in parallel. In the current situation, even if the rates decrease as 
the first three months of 2014 have shown, the remainder of the state remains broken. 
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The use of the military has been the easy button to push while the remainder of the state 
and society remain weak.  
Notwithstanding, the state must fight the major drug trafficking element taking 
root in the country. Honduras is in danger of becoming a processor and producer. There 
are thousands of drug dealers, transporters and facilitators. Easy money has made its way 
into the Honduran economy, creating the largest source of illicit income the country has 
ever seen. These criminal bands are now able to fight the state authorities and bribe them. 
The use of TIGRES and PMOP must be used strategically to after the most dangerous 
criminals that operate in and out of Honduras. The situation is critical and actions to 
combat the transnational crime element must be swift and severe. The trend will prove 
difficult if those killed and arrested are the petty criminals at the bottom of the food 
chain, while the most powerful and astute are able to circumvent the justice system and 
evade prosecution. A near-term solution may lay in an extraditing agreement with the 
United States for the most wanted criminals, but at some point the Public Ministry and 
the criminal justice system must stand on their own. The reality, however, is that it will 
take many years for that to happen.   
Arrests and Detentions  
The Honduran police and authorities performing law enforcement must not 
conduct arrests of suspected mareros without a strong likelihood of imprisonment. 
Mareros that are arrested and then returned to the streets because of lack of evidence or a 
weak case, only become stronger upon their return to their community. The street stories 
of how tough they are and how they can get away with things are reinforced when they 
are released. Roundup followed by quick release increases their credibility in the street 
and helps them recruit more street children and juveniles from their barrios. Further, the 
lessons in Latin America and Central America in particular have shown that a state 
cannot incarcerate its way out of the security problem.  
Furthermore, the prison situation must be addressed so that prisoners are not able 
to send orders for murder and extortions form inside prison walls. Passage of the law 
forcing the termination of cell coverage, and placing the military to guard the outside 
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perimeters, are only temporary band-aids. The situation has the potential to escalate to the 
point of more tragedies like the three previous fires, but also creating a powerful prison 
culture that may outlast the current crime wave.  
Honduran prisons are not only run by inmates, but the prison administrators lack 
the capacity, training and resources to do much of anything except hope that the prisoners 
do not revolt. In fact, the Director of the Honduran prison system, Santos Simeón Flores, 
when confronted with the issues of Honduran prisons and notorious criminals escaping 
did not argue against the claims. However, the situation and conditions of the prison 
system that he portrayed is so dire that the only thing keeping prisoners from rioting, 
killing each other or attempting to escape is by the grace of God.211  
Partnership for Rehabilitation  
The Honduran state is no position to arrest thousands of youths and put them in 
prison with older more dangerous criminals or in juvenile prisons where there are no 
resources to attend to their needs. A more practical approach will be to partner with 
organizations and churches that have experience working with troubled youth. This also 
adds a layer of legitimacy that the government is trying to help at-risk youth while at the 
same time incorporating civil society and families as part of the solution.  
Any plan of action in Honduras must take into account that the change in the 
criminal environment needs to be long-term, but must also have attainable short-term and 
medium-term results. The policies may not survive unless there is buy-in from the 
population, and for that citizens need to see that things are getting progressively better. 
Thus far, Honduran leaders are correctly fixated on chamba y seguridad (jobs and 
security) as the answer to virtually all the problems, but not all are pushing with all their 
might and when they do it is usually in the wrong direction.  
 
 
                                                 
211 Frente A Frente: Honduras “Debate con el Director de Centros Penitenciarios,” April 7, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ESg51dQX_M. 
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